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Abstract
This Article represents the first attempt to systematically
assess and compare the goals of international criminal courts to
one another. To compare them, it focuses on their expected value.
This is the value of the benefit that would occur if the goal were
to be achieved, multiplied by the likelihood that it will be
achieved. This approach allows for goals of differing value and
likelihood of achievement to be compared to one another. The goal
with the highest expected value is the goal that is most important
and that international criminal courts should prioritize.
This Article demonstrates that it is possible to establish a
hierarchy of the goals of international criminal courts. Moreover,
it finds that the most important goal is the prevention of
violations of international criminal law. This is perhaps
surprising given that many scholars appear to have concluded
that prevention is not achievable. Nevertheless, preventing
violations would have enormous value. Perhaps more
importantly, recent empirical research strongly suggests that
courts can prevent violations. The result is that prevention is
moderately likely to occur and has an extremely high value when
it does occur. As such, it has a higher expected value than any of
the other goals commonly attributed to international tribunals
including retribution, establishing the historical record,
providing closure for victims, or fostering post-conflict

Associate Professor of Law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago,
Illinois. This Article was greatly improved by the comments of those who read
earlier versions, including Professors Daryl Lim, Margaret Ryznar, Jonathan
Witmer-Rich, Alexander Greenawalt, and the participants in the 2017 ASIL
Midwest Interest Group Annual Conference and the 2017 ASIL Midyear
Research Forum. Any mistakes that remain are mine. This Article was made
possible by a summer research grant from the John Marshall Law School.
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reconciliation. Accordingly, international criminal courts should
make preventing violations their priority.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly ten years ago, Professor Damaška realized that there
is a significant lacuna in discussions about the goals of
international criminal courts: while there is a great deal of
literature about particular goals, there has been no attempt to
establish a hierarchy of those goals.1 As a result, much of the
literature operates in a vacuum. While many scholars have
argued that a particular goal, considered on its own, is the most
important, there has been virtually no discussion of the value of
each goal relative to the others. As this Article demonstrates,
there is much that can be learned about the goals of
international criminal courts by considering all of them
simultaneously and comparing them to one another.
First, having an established hierarchy of those goals brings
clarity to an important theoretical question. The extensive
literature about the goals of international criminal courts
demonstrates their importance.2 Given their importance, it is
somewhat surprising that nobody has tried to articulate a formal
hierarchy of those goals. By establishing such a hierarchy, this
Article represents a significant contribution to our knowledge
about international criminal tribunals.
Second, having an established hierarchy will benefit both
international courts and the states that fund them. Courts have
limited resources and cannot pursue all of the goals that have
been set for them.3 Placing those goals in a hierarchy will allow
courts to focus their resources on the goals that will yield the
most value. This should lead, in time, to courts being more
successful in achieving their goals. Ultimately, this will also
benefit those states that fund international criminal courts.4
1. See Mirjan Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal
Justice?, 83 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 329, 331 (2008) (“The list of goals
proclaimed by international criminal courts and their affiliates is very long.”);
Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. J.
427, 428 (2004) (“A long list of purposes has been ascribed to the ICTY and the
ICC, and other similar tribunals . . . .”).
2. The breadth of the literature about the goals of international criminal
courts can be seen by looking at the sources cited during the initial discussion
of those goals. See infra Section III.
3. See infra Section III.
4. See Stuart Ford, What Investigative Resources Does the International
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This Article represents the first attempt to systematically
assess and compare the goals of international criminal courts to
one another. To compare them, it focuses on their expected
value. This is the value of the benefit that would occur if the goal
were to be achieved multiplied by the likelihood that it will be
achieved.5 This approach allows for goals of differing value and
likelihood of achievement to be compared to one another. The
goal with the highest expected value is the goal that is most
important and that international criminal courts should
prioritize.6
This Article demonstrates that it is possible to establish a
hierarchy of the goals of international criminal law.7 Moreover,
it argues that the most important goal in the hierarchy is the
prevention of violations of international criminal law.8 This may
be surprising given that many scholars appear to have concluded
in recent years that prevention is unachievable.9 Nevertheless,
it is clear that preventing violations would have enormous
value.10 Perhaps more importantly, recent empirical research
strongly suggests that courts can prevent violations.11 The result
is that prevention is moderately likely to occur and has an
extremely high value when it does occur. As such it has a higher
expected value than any of the other goals commonly attributed
to international tribunals including retribution, establishing the
historical record, providing closure for victims, or fostering postconflict reconciliation.12 Accordingly, international criminal
courts should make preventing violations their priority.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section II describes the
outputs of international criminal courts. Section III discusses
the most-commonly articulated goals that states, scholars and
commentators have urged courts to pursue. The methodology for
this Article is presented in Section IV. Section V evaluates each
of the goals of international tribunals for both how often the goal
Criminal Court Need to Succeed?: A Gravity-Based Approach, 16 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 70 (2017) (arguing that states have a vested interest
in the success of the courts they fund and that court success benefits funding
states).
5. See infra Section IV.
6. Id.
7. See infra Section VI.
8. See infra Table 3.
9. See infra Section V.H.2.
10. See infra Section V.H.8–13.
11. See infra Section V.H.4–7.
12. See infra Section VI.
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is likely to be achieved and what the benefit the goal would
confer if it were achieved. These factors are used to determine
the expected value of each goal. Section VI presents the results
of the assessments in Section V and turns them into a formal
hierarchy of the goals of international criminal courts. This
Article’s conclusions and some recommendations for future
research appear in Section VII.
II. THE OUTPUT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS
The principal work of international criminal tribunals is to
determine the guilt or innocence of individuals accused of
violating international criminal law.13 They do this by
conducting trials.14 The trials are thus their most important
output.15 But if the trials (and subsequent incarceration of those

13. See Shahram Dana, Turning Point for International Justice?, in XI
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 962, 972
(Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2007) (“The primary function of the
international criminal tribunal is to determine the criminal responsibility and
punishment of those individuals found guilty of the crimes under its
jurisdiction.”); O-Gon Kwon, The Challenge of An International Criminal Trial
as Seen from the Bench, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 360,
373 (2007) (“The task of determining guilt or innocence must take precedence
over other, not strictly judicial, considerations.”); Jenia Iontcheva Turner,
Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48
VA. J. INT’L L. 529, 534 (2008) (arguing that “the main function of trials is to
determine individual culpability and to assess appropriate punishment through
a fair process.”).
14. U.N. Secretary-General, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc A/C.5/52/4 (Oct. 21, 1997)
(“[Chambers] performs the fundamental core activity of the Tribunal, that is,
the trial and determination of guilt or innocence of persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law within the territory of the
former Yugoslavia.”); Adrian Fulford, The Reflections of a Trial Judge, 22
CRIMINAL L.F. 215, 216 (2011) (“We are first, foremost and last a criminal court:
our core business is to process criminal trials. All the rest, and I hasten to add
some of the rest is very important indeed (such as our deterrent potential,
reparations to victims and outreach), is secondary to the Court’s obligation to
investigate, arrest and try alleged criminals.”).
15. The trials are the outputs of the ICC’s process because they are the
direct result of the ICC’s operations. See Yuval Shany, Assessing the
Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AMERICAN J.
INT’L L. 225, 248 (2012). They should not be confused with the outcomes of the
court, which would be the effects of its outputs on the external state of the world.
Id. This distinction between outputs and outcomes is very important. See infra
Section III (arguing that states would not pay for international tribunals solely
to generate their direct outputs and that such courts are unsustainable unless
they can also achieve certain outcomes in the external world).
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found guilty) were all that such tribunals accomplished, it is
unlikely that the international community would continue to
fund them. This is true for three reasons: trials are very rare,
very expensive, and very complex.
First, trials at international criminal courts are extremely
rare. Over the course of about twenty years, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted 161
people, but has tried only 98.16 The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the next largest international
tribunal, indicted ninety-one people, but has only tried seventyfive.17 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) originally
indicted thirteen individuals, but only brought ten of them to a
trial.18 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC) charged eight people, but has only tried three.19 In the
16. See Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, http://www.icty.org/en/content/
infographic-icty-facts-figures (showing that the ICTY has sentenced eighty
individuals and acquitted eighteen more). Of course, that figure does not
completely describe the ICTY’s workload. There are ongoing proceedings
against another twelve individuals, thirteen individuals have been transferred
to domestic jurisdictions for trial, and proceedings were terminated against
another thirty-six individuals. Id. Even if you include all of these people,
however, the ICTY only indicted 161 individuals.
17. See The ICTR in Brief, International Criminal tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal (showing that the ICTR has
indicted ninety-one people, of whom sixty-one were convicted and sentenced,
fourteen were acquitted, and the remaining individuals either died, are still
fugitives, or had their cases referred to national jurisdictions).
18. See Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.rscsl.org/ (noting that
“[i]n March 2003 the Prosecutor brought the first of 13 indictments against
leaders of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), and thenLiberian President Charles Taylor. Ten persons were brought to trial. Two
others died, one of them before proceedings could commence (RUF Leader Foday
Sankoh) and one outside the jurisdiction of the Court (RUF Battlefield
Commander Sam Bockarie). A third, (AFRC Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma),
fled Sierra Leone shortly before he was indicted. While some evidence suggests
that Koroma is dead, it is not considered conclusive and he is therefore officially
considered to be at large.”).
19. The ECCC initially charged five former members of the Khmer Rouge,
but one of them subsequently died and another was ruled unfit to stand trial.
See Christoph Sperfeldt, From the Margins of Internationalized Criminal
Justice: Lessons Learned at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1111, 1113 (2013). In 2009, the CoProsecutors requested the initiation of investigations into five additional
suspects in what came to be known as Case 003 and Case 004. See ECCC, Case
003,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/286.
One
individual
was
subsequently charged in connection with Case 003. Id. Two individuals were
charged in connection with Case 004. See ECCC, Case 004, http://www.eccc.gov.
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thirteen years since the International Criminal Court (ICC) was
established, the ICC has issued arrest warrants for forty people,
of which, twelve have either been tried or are in the midst of a
trial.20 The result is that only about 300 individuals have been
indicted by international criminal courts since the mid-1990s.
Slightly less than 200 of them have had their guilt adjudicated.
Domestic jurisdictions adjudicate far more criminal cases
than international tribunals can ever hope to. For example,
there are more than 20 million new criminal cases opened each
year in the United States.21 The courts in England and Wales22
open approximately 1.7 million new criminal cases each year.23
Each year, the Canadian courts complete about 400,000 criminal
cases24 and more than 700,000 new criminal cases are initiated
in Australia.25
kh/en/case/topic/98. As a result, the ECCC eventually charged eight people, but
only three people were actually tried. Kang Guek Eav alias Duch was tried and
convicted in Case 001. See ECCC, Case 001, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/
case/topic/1. Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were tried and convicted in Case
002/01. See ECCC, Case 002, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/2. Trials
have not begun in Case 003 or Case 004. See ECCC, Case 003,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/286; ECCC, Case 004, http://www.eccc.
gov.kh/en/case/topic/98.
20. See List of people indicted in the International Criminal Court,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_indicted_in_the_Inter
national_Criminal_Court (last vistited Jan. 8, 2018). Of the rest, charges have
been withdrawn against a number of them, some have died, and the remainder
are fugitives. Id.
21. See R. LAFOUNTAIN, R. SCHAUFFLER, S. STRICKLAND, S. GIBSON, & A.
MASON, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE
COURT CASELOADS (National Center for State Courts 2011), at 20 (indicating
that in 2009 there were more than 20 million new criminal cases filed in state
courts in the United States).
22. The crown courts and magistrates’ courts represent the main criminal
courts. See Ministry of Justice, Criminal court statistics quarterly, England and
Wales, October to December 2015, dated March 31, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/512100/bulletin.pdf.
23. The magistrates’ courts receive approximately 400,000 criminal cases
per quarter, while the crown courts—which hear more serious cases—receive
approximately 30,000 cases per quarter. Id. at fig. 1 (Magistrates’ courts
caseload) and fig. 2 (Crown courts caseload). Scotland and Northern Ireland
have their own separate criminal court systems and report their caseloads
separately.
24. See Ashley Maxwell, Adult Criminal Court Statistics in Canada
2013/2014, Statistics Canada, Sept. 28, 2015, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85002-x/2015001/article/14226-eng.htm. The number of completed criminal cases
in Canada has fluctuated between 360,000 and 410,000 for the last decade. See
id. at Chart 1.
25. See AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY, AUSTRALIAN CRIME:
FACTS & FIGURES 2014 59, (2014), http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/
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Second, trials at international tribunals are very
expensive.26 All told, international criminal courts spent more
than $6 billion between 1993 and 2015.27 This amounts to almost
$30 million dollars spent per individual tried. Most domestic
trials cost far less.28
Third, international trials are extremely complex. For
example, the average trial at the ICTY took 171 trial days to
complete, and involved the testimony of 121 witnesses and the
entry into evidence of more than 2,000 exhibits.29 Trials at other
international criminal courts have a similar level of
complexity.30 Domestic criminal trials, on the other hand, take
much less time. In fact, the majority of criminal trials heard in
federal district courts in the United States take less than one
trial day to complete.31 And less than one half of one percent of
federal criminal trials took more than twenty days to complete.32
The reality of spending more than $6 billion to try about 200
individuals has led to claims that international criminal
tribunals are too slow, too expensive, and too inefficient.33 I have
shown elsewhere that the conventional wisdom regarding the

facts/2014/facts_and_figures_2014.pdf.
26. See Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal
Courts, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2014) [hereinafter Ford, Complexity and
Efficiency]. The ICTY will cost more than $2.7 billion between 1993 and 2017.
Id. at 36. The ICTR is expected to cost about $1.75 billion over roughly the same
period. See also Stuart Ford, How Leadership in International Criminal Law is
Shifting from the United States to Europe and Asia: An Analysis of Spending on
and Contributions to International Criminal Courts, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 953,
973 (2011) [hereinafter Ford, How Leadership is Shifting]. The International
Criminal Court (ICC) has cost at least $1.6 billion since 2002. Id.at 961.
27. Id. at 960.
28. Data on the costs of domestic criminal trials is extremely hard to come
by. See Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26, at 45 (noting the
difficulty of finding data on domestic criminal systems). Nevertheless, murder
trials in the United States seem to usually cost hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Id. at 53–55 (discussing the costs of murder trials in North Carolina,
Maryland and Kansas). It seems safe to assume that most criminal trials cost
less than the typical murder trial.
29. See Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26, at Table 2.
30. Id. at 31–32.
31. Id. at 32–33.
32. Id. at 33.
33. See, e.g., Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International
Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541, 543 (2004) (arguing that there is a
“pervasive” dissatisfaction among states with international criminal tribunals
and a “perception” that their cost is not justified by the small number and
lengthy nature of the trials that take place).
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efficiency of international criminal tribunals is wrong,34 but it is
true that trials at international tribunals are very expensive and
very rare. Indeed, if the only thing that international courts
accomplished was to try a handful of very expensive cases, with
no other effect on the world beyond the incarceration of the
accused if he or she was found guilty, it is unlikely that the
international community would continue to establish and fund
them.
At first, this claim may seem strange given that states
manifestly do establish and fund international criminal courts
and their main work consists of trying individuals accused of
serious violations of international criminal law.35 But states
expect courts to accomplish far more than just trying a handful
of individuals—no matter how deserving those individuals are of
punishment. Indeed, states attach a relatively low value to the
determination of guilt or innocence and the imposition of an
appropriate sentence. Rather, states fund international
tribunals primarily because of the other goals they hope them to
accomplish.36
There is a critical difference between a court’s outputs (the
work it performs) and its outcomes (the impact of its work on the
world).37 States do not fund international courts so that those
courts can produce particular outputs.38 Rather, they fund
courts because they believe the courts will lead to particular
outcomes in the external world.39 Trials are the principal output
of international criminal courts,40 but states would not fund such
courts solely to conduct trials if those trials did not have some
larger impact on the world.
For example, Ralph Zacklin41 argued that states became
dissatisfied with the ad hoc tribunals because their costs were
34. See generally Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26.
35. Understanding the International Criminal Court, ICC at 1,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf.
36. See Shany, supra note 15, at 230.
37. See supra note 15 (explaining the difference between outputs and
outcomes).
38. Cf. Shany, supra note 15, at 249 (“From a goal-based perspective,
outputs are mere instruments or means to attain social outcomes, and thus
represent a less important object of study than outcomes.”).
39. See Shany, supra note 15, at 230 (arguing that courts are viewed as
effective when they achieve their desired outcomes).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 13–15.
41. Ralph Zacklin was Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs at the
United Nations and played a key role in development of the ad hoc tribunals.
See Zacklin, supra note 33.
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far greater than their tangible accomplishments42 and that the
courts represented an approach that was “no longer politically
or financially viable.”43 Zacklin’s argument assumes that states
decide whether to support courts by weighing the costs of
international tribunals against the benefit to be derived from
their impact on the world. And, indeed, it is widely accepted that
states are rational actors who make decisions on whether to
create or become members of international organizations based
on a calculation of the costs and benefits of membership.44
Ultimately, Zacklin concluded that states would not continue to
fund international criminal courts solely to conduct slow,
expensive trials unless they could show some impact on the
external world.45
That does not mean that states will not found or become
members of international criminal courts. Indeed, since
Zacklin’s article was written, 124 states have become members
of the International Criminal Court.46 So, it is clear that states
are still willing to both found and join international tribunals.
However, states will not do so solely so that courts can
adjudicate the guilt or innocence of a handful of accused; the
expense must be justified by something beyond just carrying out
trials.47
42. See id. at 543 (arguing that most states felt the cost of the courts “is not
wholly justified” because of the inability of the courts to fulfill their purpose of
“bringing to justice those responsible for the most serious crimes in a timely and
expeditious manner.”).
43. Id. at 545. See also Alex Whiting, In International Criminal
Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323,
24 (2009) (arguing that the “conventional wisdom among policymakers,
practitioners and commentators,” both academic and popular, was that
prosecutions at international criminal courts have been far too slow to justify
their expense).
44. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through
Formal International Organizations, 42 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 6 (1998) (“We
assume, for simplicity, that states are the principal actors in world politics and
that they use IOs to create social orderings appropriate to their pursuit of
shared goals . . . .We start with the pursuit of efficiency and employ the logic of
transaction costs economics and rational choice . . . .”); Barbara Koremenos et
al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 62
(2001) (“Our basic presumption, grounded in the broad tradition of rationalchoice analysis, is that states use international institutions to further their own
goals, and they design institutions accordingly.”) (emphasis in original).
45. See Zacklin, supra note 33, at 545.
46. ICC, Joining the International Criminal Court Why does it matter?
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/Universality_Eng.pdf (“124
states are parties to the Rome Statute.”).
47. See Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive
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III.

THE GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS

The goals of international criminal courts are much broader
than simply conducting trials, and it is achievement of these
goals that motivates states to join a court.48 Professor Shany has
argued that this is essentially how all international
organizations operate. Their outputs are the means by which
their goals are achieved,49 but ultimately, it is the achievement
of those goals that matters, not the particular outputs
themselves. And indeed, all international criminal courts are
premised on the idea that conducting trials has some effect on
the world beyond just determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.50
For example, the Rome Statute of the ICC argues that it will
“contribute to the prevention of” serious violations of
international criminal law.51 It also establishes a goal of
“put[ting] an end to impunity.”52 Other international tribunals
have been given similar goals. For example, the United Nations
Security Council asserted that the ICTY would contribute to
ending widespread violations of international law and that it
would “contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
peace.”53 It made similar claims when it created the ICTR.54
These are not the only goals that have been attributed to
international criminal courts.55 Over the last twenty years,
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 269-70,
276 (2012) (arguing that retribution alone cannot justify the ICC’s work
suggesting that states are not fundamentally retributivists and that they are
not willing to pay for international trials if their only purpose is to punish the
guilty).
48. Cf. Shany, supra note 15, at 230 (arguing that the effectiveness of
international courts should be measured by whether they achieve their goals
rather than by whether they produce a particular output).
49. Id.
50. Cf. id. at 248 (defining the outcome of an international court as the
effect of its outputs on the external state of the world).
51. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., July 17, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 1002, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
52. Id.
53. See S.C. Res. 808 (Feb 22, 1993).
54. See S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (arguing that the ICTR could contribute
to putting an end to crimes, be an effective measure to bring to justice those
persons responsible for them, ensure that crimes were effective redressed, and
“contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and
maintenance of peace”).
55. This Article will often use the terminology of goals rather than

2018]

GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS

189

courts, states, and commentators have identified many potential
goals for international tribunals.56 The most commonlyarticulated goals are:


preventing violations of international criminal
law;57



ending impunity for past violations;58



maintaining or restoring international peace and
security;59

outcomes to describe the effect of tribunals on the world because this is how
most of the literature frames the issue. But it is worth noting that the two terms
are largely synonymous. Compare supra note 15 (defining outcomes as the
effects of a court’s work on the external world) with OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS,
NEW OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds.,
3d ed. 2010) (defining a goal as “the object of a person’s ambition or effort; an
aim or desired result”).
56. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331 (“The list of goals proclaimed by
international criminal courts and their affiliates is very long.”); see also Schrag,
supra note 1, at 428 (“A long list of purposes has been ascribed to the ICTY and
the ICC, and other similar tribunals . . . .”).
57. See supra Section III (noting that the Preamble to the Rome Statute
explicitly identifies prevention as one of the goals of the ICC). See also
deGuzman supra note 47 at 306–08 (noting that deterrence is “frequently
invoked” as a justification for the work of international tribunals); Justin Levitt,
Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law – II: The Promises of
International Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1961 (2001) (“The specific
aim of prosecution that tribunal affiliates recite most frequently is the
prevention of future violations of international humanitarian law.”).
58. See supra Section III (noting that the Rome Statute explicitly identifies
ending impunity and ensuring effective prosecution as one of the goals of the
ICC). See also William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The
International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of
International Justice, 49 HARV. J. INT’L L. 53, 68-73 (2008) (arguing that the
ICC can help end impunity by encouraging domestic systems to undertake
prosecutions of international crimes); id. at 107 (“The International Criminal
Court’s core mission is to end impunity for the most serious international
crimes.”); Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that international courts are
supposed to “end impunity for violations, especially for senior political and
military leaders”).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 53–54. See also Turner, supra note
13, at 537–39; Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 7 (2001) (arguing that the
indictment and prosecution of “leaders with criminal dispositions and a vested
interest in conflict makes a positive contribution to post-conflict peace
building”); Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 739 (“The most important function of
international criminal justice is the restoration of peace.”).
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establishing a reliable historical record;60



providing closure or redress for victims;61



expressing condemnation of crimes that are
abhorrent;62



fostering post-conflict reconciliation;63



developing international criminal law;64 and



assigning responsibility for wrongs
punishing the guilty (i.e., retribution).65

and

These are not all of the goals that have been attributed to

60. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331. See also Janine Natalya Clark, Plea
Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
415, 425 (2009) (arguing that the ICTY “considers one of its primary purposes
to be the creation of a historical record”); Regina E. Rauxloh, Negotiated History:
The Historical Record in International Criminal Law and Plea Bargaining, 10
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 739, 740 (2010) (arguing that establishing “a historical
record of the roots and the development of the violence is one of the main
functions of all international criminal courts”); Turner, supra note 13, at 539–
41.
61. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 333–34 (“An attempt to restore the
dignity of victims and to provide them, or their families, with a forum in which
to express their suffering is, of course, an ennobling humanitarian impulse.”);
Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that international courts are supposed to
be able to “bring repose to victims” and “provide a safe forum for victims to tell
their stories”); Turner, supra note 13, at 542–43.
62. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (describing the “didactic objective of
improving respect for human rights by expressing outrage for their violation”);
de Guzman, supra note 47, at 312–19 (arguing that the ICC should use its
prosecutions to express condemnation of wrongdoing). See also Schrag, supra
note 1, at 428 (arguing that the goals of international tribunals include “public
education in general” as well as “illuminat[ing] explanations about what caused
the violations and illustrat[ing] particular patterns of conduct”).
63. See Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy
of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional
Justice Mechanisms, 45 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405, 463–75 (2012)
(arguing that international criminal courts can foster post-conflict
reconciliation); de Guzman, supra note 47, at 311, Levitt, supra note 57, at
1970–71.
64. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that one purpose attributed to
international tribunals is to “develop and expand the application and
interpretation of international law and norms”).
65. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331; de Guzman, supra note 47, at 301–
05; Levitt, supra note 57, at 1969.
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international tribunals,66 but they are the most common.
As others, including Professor Damaška, have noted, this
list of goals is long and unwieldy.67 Moreover, some of the goals
may contradict one another.68 For example, the goal of ending
impunity for past violations may be in tension with the goal of
maintaining peace.69 Similarly, there may be tension between
the desire to create an accurate historical record and the court’s
focus on determining the guilt of the accused.70 The large
number of goals, as well as their possible inconsistency, has led
to pessimism about whether courts can achieve all of them.71
Professor Damaška realized that another problem is that
there is no generally accepted hierarchy of the goals.72 This is a
serious problem because, without any agreement on relative
importance, courts cannot know which goals to prioritize. Given
that some of the goals may be in tension with each other73 and
that international tribunals have limited resources with which
to work,74 they cannot be expected to maximize their
66. Minna Schrag, for example, lists fifteen separate goals in her article
about the ICTY. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428.
67. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331 (“It does not require much pause to
realize that the task of fulfilling all of these self-imposed demands is truly
gargantuan.”).
68. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428–29 (“The experience of the ICTY has
shown that there is inherent tension among some of [the court’s] goals . . . .”).
69. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331–32. See also Schrag, supra note 1,
at 429 (noting that some early critics of the ICTY argued that its attempts to
investigate violations were making it harder to achieve peace in the Balkans).
70. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 332–33. See also Turner, supra note 13,
at 534 (noting that some theorists have argued that determining guilt or
innocence is the only appropriate goal of international tribunals and that other
goals, “such as the establishment of a thorough historical record or full public
reckoning with the actions of a previous regime, are to be left in the
background”); id. at 540–41 (noting the tension between establishing an
accurate historical record and the trial’s focus on determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused).
71. See generally Damaška, supra note 1 (arguing that international
criminal courts are unlikely to be able to achieve their many goals). See, e.g., de
Guzman, supra note 47, at 301–09 (arguing that the ICC will have difficulty
achieving the goals of retribution and deterrence).
72. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (“Managing tensions among the
goals, and dealing with the courts’ limitations in attaining some of them, would
be greatly facilitated if a set of priorities existed based on an understanding of
the relative weights of competing goals.”). See also Schrag, supra note 1, at 428
(noting that there is a “lack of consensus” about which of the goals should be
given priority).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 68–70.
74. See Burke-White, supra note 58, at 53–54 (noting the contrast between
the high expectations of the ICC and the reality that the ICC has limited
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contributions to all of the goals simultaneously.75 Rather, if they
are to have an impact on the world, they must focus their
resources where they will do the most good. Thus, having an
accepted hierarchy among the goals would permit courts to make
decisions about how to allocate their resources so as to maximize
their effect on the most important goals.76 This Article seeks to
guide courts in their decision-making by demonstrating that
there is a discernable hierarchy and that some goals should be
given priority over others.77
IV.

METHODOLOGY

Producing a hierarchy of the goals of international criminal
courts requires a methodology. While there are a number of
different methodologies that could be used to create such a
hierarchy, this Article will use the expected value of the various
goals to rank them. The expected value of a particular goal is
defined as the value of the benefit that would occur if that goal
were achieved multiplied by the likelihood that the benefit will
occur. This permits the benefit of achieving different goals to be
discounted by the likelihood that such goals will actually be
achieved. Thus, a goal with a modest actual benefit but a high
likelihood of achievement might have a higher expected value
than a goal that had a high actual benefit (if that goal were
achieved) but which was extremely unlikely to occur. Using this
methodology, the goal that yields the greatest expected value is
the most important goal and the one that international tribunals
should strive to achieve.
This Article will not, however, calculate an exact expected
value for any of the possible goals of international criminal
tribunals. There is too much uncertainty about both how likely
it is that particular goals can be achieved as well as what
resources and modest capabilities); id. at 64–67.
75. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 301 (noting that the “resource
limitations” of international tribunals require them to make decisions about
which cases to prosecute but that to do so they must first be able to identify
which goals are most important).
76. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339; deGuzman, supra note 47, at 267
(noting that “the international community has provided the [ICC] virtually no
guidance about what goals it should seek” and that the lack of priorities
represents a “serious challenge” for the court).
77. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 344 (arguing that, even if it is not
possible to formally rank all the goals of international criminal courts, it would
still be advantageous to identify the most important one).
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benefits would occur if the goal was achieved to assign specific
values to the different goals. Instead, this Article will categorize
whether the likelihood of achieving a particular goal is likely,
moderately likely, unlikely, or extremely unlikely. Similarly, the
benefit of achieving a particular goal (assuming it can be
attained) will be categorized as low, moderate, high, or
extremely high. Each goal can then be placed in a matrix that
allows its expected value to be assessed against the other goals.78
Table 1 (below) represents such a matrix.
Table 1: Expected Value of Goals
Extremely

Value if benefit occurs

High
High

Moderate

Low
Extremely
Unlikely

Unlikely

Moderately
Likely

Likely

Likelihood of benefit occurring

Goals that appear in the bottom left corner of the matrix
have both an extremely low likelihood of occurring and a low
value when they do occur. They will have the lowest expected
value. Goals that appear in the upper right corner of the matrix
are both likely to occur and have an extremely high value when
they do occur. They will have the highest expected value.
The process of categorizing the likelihood of achieving a
particular goal and the benefit that would accrue if that goal
were achieved will be done based on: 1) inferences drawn from
the theory underpinning each of the goals; and 2) the existing
literature about the achievement of those goals. Quantitative
data will be incorporated where available, but much of the
78. This is analogous to a risk matrix, which is a tool used to manage risks
in organizational settings. See Louis Anthony Cox, Jr., What’s Wrong with Risk
Matrices?, 28 RISK ANALYSIS 497, 497–98 (2008).
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analysis will be qualitative rather than quantitative because
there have been few empirical studies of the goals of
international criminal courts.
While there are other approaches one could use to evaluate
the relative importance of the goals of international criminal
courts, a methodology focused on expected value was chosen
because it is consistent with how states make decisions about
whether to support such courts. States are rational actors who
weigh the expected benefits of membership when deciding
whether to join and support international courts.79 States are
also the most important stakeholders because without their
political and financial support international criminal courts
could not function.80 Thus, identifying and pursuing the goal
with the greatest expected value maximizes the likelihood that
states will continue to support international tribunals.
The goals that are most important to states would also
result in enormous public welfare gains if they could be
achieved.81 While states value these gains, the principal
beneficiaries would be individuals. So, while this Article focuses
on which goals states value, most of the benefits would accrue to
society as a whole.
The term “goal” is central to this Article and it is important
to note the difference between a goal and a mechanism for
achieving that goal. A goal is a particular aim or desired result.82
In contrast, a mechanism is a process by which something—in
this Article, a particular goal—is brought about.83 Many of the
“goals” that have been advanced by scholars are not really goals
at all. Rather, they are mechanisms by which some other goal is
to be achieved. For example, scholars have argued that courts
should express condemnation of abhorrent acts,84 but this “goal”
79. See supra Section III.
80. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 268 (noting that without the support
of states, the ICC would have “no funding, no defendants to prosecute, and no
evidence with which to conduct prosecutions”).
81. See infra Section V.H.
82. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, supra note 55 (defining a goal as “the object
of a person’s ambition or effort; an aim or desired result”).
83. Id. (defining mechanism as “a natural or established process by which
something takes place or is brought about”).
84. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (describing the “didactic objective of
improving respect for human rights by expressing outrage for their violation”);
de Guzman, supra note 47, at 312–19 (arguing that the ICC should use its
prosecutions to express condemnation of wrongdoing). See also Schrag, supra
note 1, at 428 (arguing that the goals of international tribunals include “public
education in general” as well as “illuminat[ing] explanations about what caused
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is not usually meant as an end in itself. Instead, the expressive
condemnation of morally abhorrent conduct is intended to help
establish and strengthen norms that will result in compliance
with international law.85 In effect, expressive condemnation is a
mechanism by which courts can prevent violations of
international criminal law.
This distinction between goals and mechanisms is very
important for calculating the expected value of the goals of
international criminal courts. To the extent that one of the goals
discussed in this Article is principally a mechanism to achieve
some other goal, it often has a low expected value. This is
because it has little value as an end in itself, even though it
might be a useful mechanism for achieving some other goal. To
use the example above, if expressing condemnation of morally
abhorrent acts is really a mechanism for preventing violations,86
then the value of any violations that are prevented is part of the
value of achieving the goal of prevention. Thus, expressing
condemnation would increase the expected value of prevention
if it increased the likelihood of prevention, but it would not
increase its own expected value. The expected value of
expressing condemnation is limited to the value that
condemnation has as an end in itself. This would be the value it
would have if it had no other effect on the world—its intrinsic
value.
V. ASSESSING THE EXPECTED VALUE OF THE GOALS
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
This Section will provide the information necessary to
evaluate the expected value of the nine goals of international
criminal tribunals identified above in Section III. Each subsection below will lay out the theory underpinning one of those
goals, then use that theory as well as the existing literature to
assess both the likelihood that the goal can be achieved and the
benefit that would occur if the goal were achieved. The subsections have been arranged roughly in order from the goal most
likely to be achieved to the goal least likely to be achieved.

the violations and illustrat[ing] particular patterns of conduct”).
85. See infra Section V.D.3.
86. See supra Section IV.7.
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A. RETRIBUTION

At least one of the goals of international tribunals is likely
to occur each time there is a trial—that of retribution. The
principal purpose of a trial is, after all, to determine whether the
accused is guilty.87 If guilt is established, the court must impose
an appropriate punishment,88 which is determined by the
gravity of the crimes and the individual circumstances of the
convicted person.89 This is a well-established way to determine
the appropriate retribution.90 Thus, trials at international
tribunals are likely to accomplish the goal of assigning
responsibility for serious violations of international criminal law
and punishing those found guilty.91 Of course, it is not
guaranteed that trials can effectively assign responsibility or
provide adequate retribution,92 but it appears that courts are
more likely to achieve this goal than any of the other potential
goals.93 Consequently, it is likely that this goal can be achieved
in most trials.
Having assessed the likelihood that retribution can be
achieved in any particular trial, the next step is to determine the
value of the benefit that occurs when it is achieved. Retribution
is often alleged to be one of the most important goals of domestic
criminal law,94 and the staff of international tribunals often view
it as a primary goal of their work.95 States, however, assign it a
87. See supra text accompanying notes 13–15.
88. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 77 (noting that punishments
for a conviction can include imprisonment, fines and the forfeiture of property).
89. See, e.g., id. art. 78(1).
90. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 301 (noting that the appropriate
retribution is determined by the seriousness of the harm caused by the crime
and the culpability of the defendant).
91. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1969.
92. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 302 (noting that many “scholars who
have studied the question” have expressed doubts about the ICC’s ability to
serve retributive ends). See also Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary
Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 684-5 (2007)
(arguing that sentences at international criminal courts are too lenient given
the magnitude of the wrongs); Levitt, supra note 57, at 1970 (noting that certain
practices, like the use of plea bargains, can undermine retributive aims and that
the punishments that international courts can give seem “inadequate” for
effective retribution given the “moral magnitude” of the crimes).
93. See infra Section VI.
94. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 280 (noting that the most commonlyarticulated purposes of domestic prosecutions are deterrence and retribution).
95. Id., at n. 69 (noting that five current and former chief prosecutors at
international tribunals expressed the view that retribution was a primary goal
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low value,96 and retribution alone cannot justify spending on
international courts.97
B. ESTABLISHING AN ACCURATE HISTORICAL RECORD
The next goal to consider—establishing an accurate
historical record—is also closely related to the trial. After all, it
is primarily through the trial that the court determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused. This is done through the
presentation of evidence.98 To convict the accused, the evidence
must be sufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused committed the crimes.99 Thus, a conviction
should be supported by evidence that is strong enough to
withstand scrutiny.100 Moreover, the end result of the trial is a
formal record, which is meant to be “complete” and “accurately
reflect[] the proceedings.”101 This could serve as the basis for an
accurate historical record.102 There are a number of reasons to
believe that the expected value of this goal is quite low, however.
First, establishing an accurate historical record is difficult and
therefore achievement of this goal is only moderately likely.
More importantly, however, the value of achieving this goal as
an end in itself is low.
There are many impediments to a court’s ability to create an
accurate historical record. For one thing, the need to establish a
historical record is sometimes at odds with the primary purpose
of the trial, which is to determine whether the accused is

of such courts).
96. See id. at 303. See also supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30 (noting that trials at
international criminal courts often involve hundreds of witnesses and
thousands of exhibits).
99. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 66(3).
100. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 744 (“The limits of evidential and
procedural rules confer legitimacy and credibility to the outcome. An
independent court establishes facts through a public trial where each element
needs to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
101. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 64(10).
102. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1973 (noting that many “tribunal affiliates”
claimed that international trials could “establish a truthful public record of past
injustices”); Turner, supra note 13, at 539 (noting that prominent academics
and judges have argued that the establishment of a historical record is one of
the most important contributions of international trials).
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guilty.103 Straying too far from this central question could
undermine the accused’s right to a fair trial.104 For example, a
prosecutor that tries to introduce evidence that helps establish
the historical record but is not necessary to support the charges
is likely to face a challenge that the evidence is irrelevant or
prejudicial.105 Thus due process considerations limit the court’s
ability to create an accurate historical record.106
In addition, courts are not an ideal mechanism for creating
a historical record. Judges are not trained historians, nor are the
other court personnel.107 Moreover, the adversarial process is not
necessarily conducive to ascertaining historical truth.108 Thus,
even if they wished to create an accurate historical record, courts
are not well suited for that task.109
The historical record can also be undermined by the use of
plea bargains. In many cases, plea deals involve the dropping of
many of the charges, which results in the record being silent
with regard to those charges.110 But even for charges that result
103. Damaška, supra note 1, at 336 (noting that courts are required to focus
on legally relevant information and must thus sometimes forego exploring
matters that would be “important to a full historical account”); See Turner,
supra note 13, at 534;
104. Damaška, supra note 1, at 334. See Turner, supra note 13, at 540-41.
105. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 743 (noting that “all evidence has to be
related to the relevant charges against the individual defendant” and that this
may prevent evidence about the context or background of the crimes from being
admitted). See also Turner, supra note 13, at 571–72 (noting that prosecutors
often attempt to introduce evidence that may provide a more complete historical
record but that is not necessary to support the charges and that defense
attorneys strenuously object to the introduction of such evidence). But see
Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 743 (noting that some international crimes contain
elements which require the prosecution to prove background information like
the existence of an armed conflict or an attack upon the civilian population).
106. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 64(2) (imposing on the Trial
Chamber an obligation to ensure that the trial is “fair and expeditious and is
conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused”); See also id. art. 67
(describing the rights of the accused).
107. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 742.
108. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 337–38.
109. Id. at 336 (noting that the requirements of a trial require an immediate
decision which cannot be modified or improved later if further evidence comes
to light, which makes courts ill-suited to the creation of a historical record). See
also id. at 340–41 (noting that the ICTY’s attempt to use the Milošević trial to
“produce a record of events accompanying the disintegration of Yugoslavia”
overwhelmed the court).
110. See Clark, supra note 60, at 427–28 (noting that charge bargaining,
where charges are dropped in return for a guilty plea, has the undesirable effect
of preventing evidence about those charges from being included in the record);
Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 753 (same).
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in convictions, plea deals usually result in a sparse factual
record.111 Thus, the use of plea bargains will usually lower the
likelihood of creating an accurate historical record.112
Another problem is that the record created by international
criminal trials is almost always incomplete. International
tribunals cannot prosecute every wrong that occurred in a given
situation.113 Prosecutors try to choose cases so that they are
representative of the overall criminality that occurred, but it is
almost always just a subset of that criminality.114 The record
may also be limited by temporal, geographic, or other limitations
on the court’s jurisdiction.115 As a result, even in the best case,
the record created by such courts is partial.116
A number of academics have tried to evaluate the likelihood
of courts establishing an accurate historical record. Their
conclusions suggest that establishing an accurate (although
partial) record is difficult but can in certain circumstances be
achieved. For example, Professor Damaška argues that the
ability of courts to create an accurate historical record is “rather
modest” and that the “best that can be expected of them is to
provide fragmentary material as a scaffolding for subsequent
historical research.”117 Professor Rauxloh acknowledges that the
history created by courts is necessarily incomplete but argues
that the experience of the International Military Tribunal at

111. See Clark, supra note 60, at 426–27 (noting that the record produced as
a result of a guilty plea is less complete and detailed than would be established
during a trial); Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 752 (same); Turner, supra note 13, at
540 (noting the reluctance of some judges to accept plea bargains because they
“only establish the bare factual allegations”).
112. But see Clark, supra note 60, at 424 (noting that in some cases guilty
pleas have provided evidence about events that were otherwise unknown and
thus did contribute to the establishment of the historical record).
113. See Michael Humphrey, International Intervention, justice and national
reconciliation: the role of the ICTY and ICTR in Bosnia and Rwanda, 2 J.
HUMAN RTS. 495, 498–99 (2003) (“The sheer number of offences makes the
prosecution of every offence impossible.”).
114. See Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26, at 64 (noting that
international courts have tended to use a philosophy of representative charging
where “the goal is to charge the accused with a representative selection of
crimes that accurately conveys the scope of the accused’s criminality”); Stuart
Ford, The Complexity of International Criminal Trials is Necessary, 48 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 151, 192–93 (2015) (describing representative charging).
115. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 742–43.
116. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1973; Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 743
(noting that “only a small minority of crimes committed in a conflict will be
brought to justice and made part of the historic record of the court”).
117. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 338.
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Nuremberg shows that international courts can sometimes
establish an accurate historical record.118 My own research
indicates that the ICTY may have begun the process of
establishing a widely-accepted account of the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia.119
Ultimately, it appears that it is only moderately likely that
courts can effectively create an accurate historical record. On the
one hand, trials create a record of the events necessary to prove
the criminal responsibility of the accused. On the other hand,
court personnel are not historians, due process limitations
prevent the court from straying too far from the facts necessary
to establish the accused’s guilt, and the use of representative
charging undercuts the record-setting function.
The second component of the expected value calculation is
estimating the value of creating an accurate historical record
(assuming it can be achieved). The value of a historical record is
low because its main value appears to be a means to achieve
some other goal. For example, I have argued that establishing a
historical record can play a role in fostering post-conflict
reconciliation.120 Others who have written about this subject
have made similar arguments.121 To the extent that establishing
a record is pursued as a mechanism to achieve some other goal,
however, the expected benefits that stem from achieving that
other goal cannot be attributed to the record. The expected value
of the record-setting function is the value of that function as an
end in itself.
Having an accurate historical record undoubtedly has some
intrinsic value,122 but it is striking that most of the arguments
about the record-setting function focus on it as a mechanism for
achieving some other goal. It is rarely called for as an end in
118. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 744. See also Ford, supra note 63, at
468–70 (noting the success of the IMT).
119. See Ford, supra note 63, at 470–71.
120. Id. at 463–75.
121. See Damaška, supra note 56, at 335 (arguing that “truth telling about
the past is a necessary precondition for reconciliation and avoidance of future
conflicts”); Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 740 (arguing that establishing the
historical record is an important component of post-conflict reconciliation
because “[o]nly when the truth is established can reconciliation begin”); Turner,
supra note 13, at 540 (noting that the establishment of a historical record has
been promoted as a means to maintain peace after conflict and prevent future
violations).
122. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1973 (noting an accurate historical record
would preserve important facts that might “otherwise be lost through an
intentional purge or the inevitable amnesia of time”).
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itself. This strongly suggests that the intrinsic benefit that flows
from achieving it is low.
C. PROVIDING CLOSURE OR REDRESS FOR VICTIMS
It is sometimes argued that international trials can provide
either closure or redress for victims of serious crimes.123 This can
occur in several ways. One way is through the process of a public
trial and verdict. This process may provide closure for victims
and their communities by formally and publicly acknowledging
the harm they have suffered.124 If the defendant pleads guilty
and provides a meaningful and sincere acknowledgement of
fault, this may also provide closure for some victims.125 In
theory, the trial can also result in some form of restitution or
reparations for victims.126
Another way that trials may provide closure for victims is
by providing opportunities to testify. Permitting people to tell
their story can be therapeutic for some witnesses.127 More
recently, the ICC has permitted victims to take on roles beyond
that of witness.128 For example, victims can make
123. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 333–34 (noting that providing victims
and their families “a forum in which to express their suffering” is a useful goal);
deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312 (“[P]rosecutions may well help to restore some
victims, offenders, and communities under some circumstances.”); Turner,
supra note 13, at 542 (noting that international trials are “said to serve
survivors of the crimes by helping them and their communities achieve a sense
of closure”).
124. See Humphrey, supra note 113, at 500 (“Society is ‘healed’ through the
prosecution and punishment of the perpetrator . . . .”); Charles P. Trumbull IV,
The Victims of Participation in International Criminal Proceedings, 29 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 777, 802–03 (2008).
125. See Clark, supra note 60, at 428–29. But see id. at 429–31 (noting that
guilty pleas are often accompanied by sentence reductions and that such
reductions can anger victims who may feel that the accused has not been
sufficiently punished).
126. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 75(1) (“The Court shall
establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”).
127. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1970–71 (arguing that individual victims
can benefit from having a “safe forum to have their stories formally heard and
acknowledged”); Trumbull, supra note 124, at 802 (noting that advocates claim
that the “simple act of testifying . . . can be therapeutic.”); Turner, supra note
13, at 542 (noting that trials can provide closure by “providing a forum for
victims to tell their stories and have the wrongs done to them formally
acknowledged”).
128. See generally Marian Pena, Victim Participation at the International
Criminal Court: Achievements Made and Challenges Ahead, 16 ILSA J. INT’L &
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“representations” to the court when the Prosecutor seeks to open
an investigation,129 and victims can have their “views and
concerns” formally considered by the court during the trial.130
These innovations provide further opportunities for victims to
participate in the process in ways that may provide closure for
them.131
Thus, it appears possible that international criminal trials
can provide redress or closure for victims. The expected value of
this goal, however, is likely to be low for two reasons. First,
providing closure or redress is difficult and achieving this goal is
unlikely for any particular victim. Second, even when it is
achieved, the actions of states suggest that it has a low value.
To begin with, while participation in the trial as either a
witness or party may provide some benefits, this is not the
typical outcome for victims of serious international crimes. The
biggest obstacle to participation is that international courts
rarely try every possible crime.132 This means that the charged
crimes are likely to cover the victimization of only a small
fraction of the total number of victims. The vast majority of
victims will have no part to play because the crimes that affected
them are not part of the trial.133
Even if the particular crime that victimized them is part of
the prosecution, there is still no guarantee that victims will
receive either closure or redress. First, victims’ avenues for
participation are limited. The average investigation at the ICC
involves allegations of more than a thousand murders, hundreds
to thousands of rapes, thousands of serious injuries, and
hundreds of thousands of instances of forcible displacement.134
COMP. L. 497 (2010); Christine Van den Wyngaert, Victims Before International
Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge, 44 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 475, 490–91 (2011).
129. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 15(3).
130. See id. art. 68(3) (“Where the personal interests of the victims are
affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and
considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the
Court . . . .”).
131. See Pena, supra note 128, at 500–01.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 113–114.
133. See Humphrey, supra note 113, at 499 (“The practical problems of time,
expense and the volume of evidence required to prosecute all offences means
that neither all perpetrators can be prosecuted nor all victims compensated.”);
Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 491–92 (noting that “[v]ictims of
uncharged crimes in situations that are before the court will not be able to
participate”).
134. See Ford, supra, note 4, at Section III(B). See also Trumbull, supra note
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Yet, evidence about large-scale victimization is usually
presented through a small number of victim-witnesses
supplemented by the testimony of forensic and demographic
experts.135 The Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC anticipates
that it will present only fifty to sixty witnesses during a typical
case.136 As a result, the vast majority of victims will not be able
to participate as witnesses, even if the particular crime that
victimized them is prosecuted.
Moreover, while there is some evidence that testifying can
be therapeutic for some victims,137 this is not a given. First of all,
the trial is not designed as a means to provide closure for
witnesses.138 While judges try to protect witnesses,139 they also
are bound to provide due process to the accused.140 This often
means that witnesses are subjected to aggressive crossexaminations by defense counsel.141 There is the possibility that
this experience will re-traumatize the witnesses rather than
help them heal.142 Testifying may also subject victims to other
124, at 811 (“Crimes falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction may involve hundreds
of thousands of victims . . . .”).
135. See Ford, The Complexity of International Criminal Trials is Necessary,
supra note 114, at 165 (noting that while the testimony of victims is used in
international trials, not every victim will testify and in cases where there are
large numbers of victims, much of the evidence related to the victims is provided
in summary form by forensic and demographic experts).
136. See Ford, supra note 4.
137. See Turner, supra note 13, at 542 (noting that the ICTY claimed that
its witnesses found that the opportunity to testify “brought them great relief”);
Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 477 (arguing that “many courageous
victims” were “very keen to come to come and testify and tell their stories”).
138. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1972 (noting that the tribunals’ procedures
are designed to “suit the requirements of legal proof” rather than ensuring the
witness’ psychological well-being).
139. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 68(1) (“The Court shall take
appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological wellbeing, dignity, and privacy of victims and witnesses.”). See also Andrew Trotter,
Witness Intimidation in International Trials: Balancing the Need for Protection
Against the Rights of the Accused, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 531–36
(describing witness protection measures employed by international courts).
140. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 68(1) (noting that victim and
witness protection measures “shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”).
141. See Humphrey, supra note 113, at 499 (arguing that the trials represent
a “legal re-enactment of violence” and that participation by victims essentially
asks them to “re-victimize themselves” by re-enacting their trauma); Turner,
supra note 13, at 568–69 (noting that defense attorneys at international trials
feel an obligation to engage in aggressive cross-examination of witnesses, even
if this might re-traumatize the witness).
142. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 342 (noting that the need to permit
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risks and several victim-witnesses have been intimidated,
threatened, or killed because of their testimony.143 Taken
together, it seems quite unlikely that any particular victim will
achieve closure by testifying at an international trial.
Unlike most of its predecessors, the ICC provides
opportunities for victims to participate as more than just
witnesses.144 This means that more victims can participate than
would otherwise be able to do so if victims were limited to being
witnesses. This participation has limits, however. For one thing,
victim participation cannot conflict with the accused’s right to a
fair trial.145 This tension between the rights of the accused and
victim participation limits the extent to which victims can
meaningfully participate in the process.146
The sheer number of victims in international trials also
limits their ability to meaningfully participate.147 At the ICC,
the large number of victims means that they have been grouped
together in victims’ groups, which limits the ability of individual
victims to meaningfully participate.148 Moreover, the victims’
vigorous cross-examination is necessary for a fair trial but runs the risk of
traumatizing victims who testify); Turner, supra note 13, at 542 (noting
concerns that testifying can re-traumatize some victims). But see Van den
Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 477 (arguing that, in practice, cross-examination
of victims “although difficult at times” was “controlled by presiding judges” to
protect victims).
143. See Trotter, supra note 139, at 522–25 (describing numerous incidents
of witness intimidation at international courts). See also Levitt, supra note 57,
at 1972 (noting that testifying has sometimes threatened the physical safety of
witnesses).
144. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 68(3).
145. See id. (noting that victim participation shall not be “prejudicial to or
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”).
146. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 342 (noting that permitting victims to
take on larger responsibilities beyond just offering testimony, for example by
allowing them to make legal arguments or question witnesses, could undermine
parts of the trial); deGuzman, supra note 47, at 311–12 (noting that “allowing
victims to participate in the determination of guilt” may violate the defendants’
rights to a fair trial); Pena, supra note 128, at 510 (noting defense concerns that
victims participation could undermine the right to a fair trial); Turner, supra
note 13, at 542–43 (noting that victim participation in trials, particularly when
it is extensive, may violate the rights of the accused to a fair and speedy trial);
Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 488 (noting the difficulty of balancing the
accused’s rights against the rights of victims).
147. See Trumbull, supra note 124, at 806–07 (noting that the large numbers
of potential victims undermines many of the potential benefits of participation).
148. See Pena, supra note 128, at 514 (noting that, in practice, “one lawyer
normally represents a group of participating victims”); Van den Wyngaert,
supra note 128, at 483 (noting that the number of victims who have requested
participation combined with the time-consuming nature of dealing with those
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“views” are presented through “legal representatives” rather
than by the victims themselves.149 This placement of a legal
representative between the victims and the court limits the
ability of victims to achieve closure.150 Even with these
limitations, victim participation consumes a great deal of the
ICC’s time and slows down the trials.151 It seems unlikely that
more meaningful participation for victims is feasible. There are
thus reasons to doubt that victims, even when they are
permitted to participate as parties, are likely to achieve closure
as a result of that participation.
Reparations are also not likely to be available to victims.
First of all, most victims will not be entitled to reparations
because their victimization is not part of the charged crimes.152
Even assuming that a victim is eligible to participate in the trial,
reparations are very unlikely. While reparations for individual
victims are theoretically possible,153 in practice, courts simply do
not have the resources to provide reparations themselves and
requests means that the court may be compelled to require victims to
participate in groups rather than individually).
149. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 68(3); Pena, supra note 128, at
514 (noting that while “the Statute does not demand that victims act through a
lawyer, that is unavoidable in practice”); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at
480 (noting that “it is theoretically possible for victims to appear individually”
but that this is “totally impractical” due to the large number of victims and that
victims are “in all cases” represented by lawyers).
150. See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 489 (“Victims who expect to
find a forum where they could personally and publicly express their grief and
thus have a platform to expose their feelings will probably be disappointed. In
mass trials, victims are necessarily represented by common legal
representatives, and consequently victims will not be able to appear in
person.”). See also Pena, supra note 128, at 515 (noting that lack of funding and
resources for legal representatives have undermined the ability of victims to
meaningfully participate); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 489 (noting
that the large numbers of victims together under common legal representatives
combined with the large distances between the court and the victims may make
it difficult for them to feel any meaningful sense of control over their own
participation).
151. Pena, supra note 128, at 509 (noting fears that “large numbers of
victims applying to participate could destabilize the proceedings”); Trumbull,
supra note 124, at 811–16; Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 481–83
(noting that the judges must rule individually on many aspects of victim
participation and that this “inevitably delays” the proceedings). It is also a very
slow and cumbersome process for the victims themselves. See Pena, supra note
128, at 511–12 (noting that some victims have had to wait two years for the
court to rule on their applications to become participants).
152. See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 492 (“Only victims of crimes
charged that lead to a conviction will be able to claim reparations.”). See also
supra text accompanying notes 132–133.
153. See supra text accompanying note 126.
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the accused are usually indigent.154 The reality is that
reparations are likely to be purely symbolic.155 In addition,
courts may not be capable of adjudicating claims for reparations
from large numbers of victims, even if resources were
available.156 Thus, there is little likelihood that victims will
receive reparations.
For various reasons, it seems unlikely that most victims of
serious international crimes can experience closure or receive
redress as a result of international trials. The biggest obstacle to
achieving closure is the selective nature of charging at
international trials. Most victims will not be able to participate
in the process at all simply because the crime that victimized
them will not be part of the trial. They cannot be witnesses, they
cannot participate as victims, they cannot receive reparations,
and the verdict will not address their suffering.
The next step in assigning an expected value to this goal is
to assess the value of achieving the goal. The Rome Statute
provides for a Trust Fund for Victims.157 The purpose of the
Trust Fund is to collect money “for the benefit of victims” and
their families.158 Contributions to the Trust Fund are
voluntary159 and states contribute slightly less than $6 million
per year.160 It seems reasonable to treat this as the value that
154. See infra Section VI.
155. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 491 (“Reparations for victims
risks being more symbolic than real.”).
156. Id. at 487 (“Imagine for a moment what might happen if, after the
criminal trial has been completed, the Trial Chamber would still have to rule
on each individual claim for reparations. If the extent of the harm suffered and
the causal link with the crimes has to be proved on an individual basis, there is
a good chance that the length of the reparations proceedings could exceed the
duration of the criminal trial itself.”).
157. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 79(1).
158. Id.
159. See The Trust Fund for Victims, Strategic Plan 2014-2017 – Summary,
at 2 (2014), http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/media_
library/documents/pdf/TFV%20Brochure%20ASP%202014%20FINAL.pdf
(noting that the Trust Fund uses “voluntary contributions from donors” to
provide “assistance to victims and their families in ICC situations through
programmes of physical rehabilitation, material support, and psychological
rehabilitation”).
160. After a slow start, the Trust Fund is now receiving approximately €5
million per year in donations. See Trust Fund for Victims, Programme Progress
Report 2015: Assistance & Reparations at 56 (2015), http://www.trustfundfor
victims.org/sites/default/files/media_library/documents/FinalTFVPPR2015.pdf
(showing total donations over time). This corresponds to less than $6 million
per year at current exchange rates. On March 11, 2016, the exchange rate was
1.1180 dollar to the euro. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
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states assign to providing redress for victims because this is how
much they are willing to voluntarily spend on this goal.161 Thus,
the actions of states strongly suggest that they assign a low
value to providing closure and redress for victims of serious
international crimes.162 Ultimately, achieving closure is unlikely
and provides a low value even when it is achieved.
D. EXPRESSING CONDEMNATION
International criminal courts are often urged to use their
trials and the resulting verdicts to express condemnation of
morally abhorrent conduct.163 Some scholars frame this goal as
one of educating the public about the court, the law, and the
atrocities that have been committed.164 Despite this slight
difference in framing, these are very similar goals and will be
treated together in this Article. The idea is that through their
trials and verdicts, courts can express condemnation for acts
that are universally recognized as unconscionable.165
International criminal courts are alleged to be in a good position
to express this condemnation because their high profile gives
them a global audience.166 Thus, their trials promote global
norms of conduct, even though those trials are small in
number.167 Many scholars argue that this educative or
Foreign Exchange Rates, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat
00_eu.htm.
161. The ICC also spends about $10 million per year on victim-related tasks.
See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 480. But the majority of this is spent
on salaries of personnel. Very little of it actually goes to victims.
162. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312 (suggesting that providing redress
for victims can serve as only a partial justification for international courts).
163. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (describing the “didactic objective of
improving respect for human rights by expressing outrage for their violation”);
deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312–19 (arguing that the ICC should use its
prosecutions to express condemnation of wrongdoing).
164. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (arguing that the goals of international
tribunals include “public education in general” as well as “illuminat[ing]
explanations about what caused the violations and illustrat[ing] particular
patterns of conduct”).
165. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 316 (arguing that the extreme gravity
of international crimes makes them worthy of expressive condemnation by
international courts).
166. Id. (arguing that the ICC’s global scope makes it a good platform for
expressing condemnation of serious violations and the expression of shared
norms).
167. Id. at 315 (suggesting that international courts can “effectively promote
important moral norms” through illustrative prosecutions even if the total
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expressive function of trials is one of their most important
features.168
Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that
expressing condemnation is not an end in itself, but a
mechanism to achieve a different goal. Expressing
condemnation of unconscionable conduct probably has some
intrinsic value, but that intrinsic value is not very large. As
noted above, states do not assign a high value to retribution as
an end in itself.169 If they do not place great value on actually
punishing wrongful conduct, it does not seem very likely that
they simultaneously attach great value to simply expressing
condemnation of wrongful conduct. And, indeed, most of those
who have written about the expressive function of courts
acknowledge that its primary value is as a mechanism to achieve
a different goal—prevention.
Professor deGuzman argues that the trials and verdicts can
be used by courts as a means of altering social norms about
acceptable conduct.170 She claims that this will eventually lead
to the prevention of future crimes as the norm comes to be more
widely accepted.171 Justin Levitt echoes this argument and
claims that tribunals engage in “moral education” about the
norms of international law primarily as a means of “long-term
prevention” of violations.172 Professor Damaška makes a similar
argument.173 Payam Akhavan talks about how “[p]ublicly
vindicating human rights norms . . . may help to prevent future
atrocities through the power of moral example to transform
behavior.”174 As these examples show, expressing condemnation
is primarily a mechanism for the prevention of international
crimes rather than an end in itself. This means that the value of
succeeding in preventing violations by utilizing this mechanism
number of prosecutions is low).
168. See id. at 270 (arguing that “the ICC’s focus should be on expressing
global norms”); id. at 301 (arguing that “the ICC’s primary objective in making
selection decision should be to express global norms”); Schrag, supra note 1, at
428–29 (arguing that the “didactic function” should be among the most
important goals of international tribunals).
169. See supra Section III.
170. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 313.
171. Id. (“Norm expression through criminal law can function as a form of
prevention – discouraging crime by entrenching values . . . .”).
172. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1966.
173. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 345 (arguing that tribunals should seek
to persuade people to comply with international criminal law by stigmatizing
violations).
174. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 10. See also id. at 12–13.
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accrues to the prevention goal. The intrinsic value of achieving
this goal is low.
For purposes of calculating an expected value of expressing
condemnation, it is also necessary to estimate how often the goal
can be accomplished. While there is little empirical evidence on
this point, it seems reasonable to assume that the verdicts are
reasonably successful in expressing condemnation of abhorrent
conduct. After all, the trials are often high-profile events that
attract considerable press coverage.175 The verdicts, moreover,
provide extensive documentation of wrongdoing which has been
tested through an adversarial process.176 And by their very
nature guilty verdicts and sentences convey condemnation.177
Thus it seems reasonable to assume that courts are moderately
likely to achieve this goal.
E. DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Another goal attributed to international tribunals is to
develop international criminal law.178 When the ad hoc tribunals
were created in the early 1990s, there were many gaps in the
law that would apply.179 The courts quickly set about trying to
fill those gaps by developing new law.180 The most famous
example of this was the ICTY’s embrace of joint criminal
enterprise. In the Tadić decision, the newly-created ICTY
created a theory of liability that permitted it to find the
defendant guilty for participating with others in a common plan

175. See supra text accompanying note 166.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 98–102.
177. See Stuart Ford, The Complexity of International Criminal Trials is
Necessary, supra note 114, at 185–86 (noting that one of the purposes of
convicting someone of a crime is to publicly condemn that person as a wrongdoer
and punish them).
178. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that one purpose attributed to
international tribunals is to “develop and expand the application and
interpretation of international law and norms”).
179. See Leena Grover, A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting
the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 543, 547 (2010) (noting that at the time the ICTY and
ICTR statutes were created, there were many gaps in both the substantive and
procedural law that had to be filled by the courts themselves).
180. See Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the
International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VANDERBILT L.
REV. 1, 25–33 (2006) (noting that the ICTY’s early decisions adopted an
expansive understanding of international criminal law).
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to achieve a criminal outcome.181 While the court claimed that
joint criminal enterprise liability already existed in
international law,182 this position has generally been rejected.183
Instead, the court essentially created a new mode of liability.184
Joint criminal enterprise went on to become a widely-used
theory of liability at the ICTY.185 In this sense, the ICTY was
successful in developing new international criminal law.186 Nor
is it the only example of an international court developing new
law.187 Indeed, it can probably be said that courts have been
fairly successful at it.188 Thus, it is moderately likely that courts
can achieve this goal, but the reactions of states suggest that this
is a goal they accord little value.
To begin with, there are doubts about whether it is wise for
courts to be in the business of developing new law.189 For
example, the theory of joint criminal enterprise has been

181. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations:
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 104–10 (2005) (describing the
development of joint criminal enterprise at the ICTY).
182. Id. at 105 (noting that the Appeals Chamber argued that it was simply
applying existing customary international law).
183. Id. at 110–12 (arguing that the WWII-era cases that the ICTY allegedly
relied upon do not provide support for the extremely broad doctrine the ICTY
adopted).
184. Id. at 103–04 (concluding that joint criminal enterprise “has largely
been created by the judges and prosecutors of the Yugoslav Tribunal”).
185. Id. at 107–08.
186. On the other hand, other courts, most notably the ICTR, did not broadly
adopt joint criminal enterprise. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 181, at
n.135 (noting that joint criminal enterprise was rarely used at the ICTR).
187. Id. at 133–34 (noting that the ICTR and ICTY developed international
law through their decisions by expanding the definitions of rape and torture).
188. See Grover, supra note 179, at 547 (noting that the ad hoc tribunals
“put flesh on the bones of modern international criminal law”).
189. See Beth van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the
Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119 (2008) (noting that it may be
quite dangerous to allow international courts free rein to develop international
criminal law and that courts that do engage in such development have tended
not to respect the principle of nullum crimen sine lege); Danner & Martinez,
supra note 181, at 142–43 (noting that when presented with opportunities to
develop substantive international law, “international judges have almost
invariably elected the most expansive interpretation” permitted and have “not
seriously grappled with the question of how to define limits” on their new
doctrines); Danner, supra note 180, at 44–49 (noting arguments both for and
against tribunal lawmaking); Schrag, supra note 1, at 431 (suggesting that the
desire to develop international criminal law is sometimes at odds with the
necessity to prove guilt in particular cases and that placing too much emphasis
on legal theory can be counter-productive).
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severely criticized by scholars as both unsupported by the
existing precedent and unfair to defendants.190 More
importantly, however, states assign a low value to having courts
develop new international law. This can be seen most clearly at
the ICC. First, unlike the somewhat loose constitutive
documents of the ad hoc tribunals, the Rome Statute is very
detailed.191 This was done because states wanted to “list crimes
within the Court’s jurisdiction exhaustively and in as detailed
and clear manner as possible so that states and their agents
could know with reasonable certainty” their obligations under
the Statute.192 Permitting judges to develop new international
law would be at odds with the drafters’ desire to know with
certainty what is prohibited.
Moreover, the Rome Statute contains an explicit provision
that limits the ability of the court to develop new international
law. Article 22(2) states that “[t]he definition of a crime shall be
strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.”193 This
provision was inserted to make it difficult for the ICC to create
new law through judicial decisions and to rein in the perceived
excesses of the ad hoc tribunals.194 States wanted to make sure

190. See supra text accompanying notes 180–184 (noting that joint criminal
enterprise was largely a creation of the ICTY); Danner & Martinez, supra note
181, at 134–36 (arguing that the creation of joint criminal enterprise by the
ICTY was problematic because it attenuates the connection between an
individual’s culpability for their own actions and their guilt); Antonio Cassese,
The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 114–23 (2007) (describing
criticisms of joint criminal enterprise); Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Liability:
Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 606 (2004) (criticizing the use of joint criminal enterprise as
a mode of liability at the ICTY).
191. See Bruce Broomball, Article 22: Nullum crimen sine lege, in OTTO
TRIFFTERER ED., COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (2d ed. 2008) at 714 (noting that the Rome Statute was the
result of “a move towards the vision . . . of a Court the subject-matter
jurisdiction of which is exhaustively defined in its constitutive instrument”);
Grover, supra note 179, at 552–53 (noting that the Rome Statute contains vastly
more detail about the crimes and the procedure than the statutes of the ICTY
and ICTR).
192. See id. at 552. See also Broomhall, supra note 191, at 714.
193. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 22(2).
194. See Grover, supra note 179, at 553 (noting that “[t]he perceived liberal
interpretive reasoning of the ad hoc tribunals was a motivating factor” in the
adoption of Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute); Broomhall, supra note 191, at
725 (“[I]t was the apparently perceived willingness of the ICTY to engage in
liberal reasoning-by-analogy that contributed, in part, to the adoption of article
22 para. 2.”).
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that if new international law was to be developed that they
would have control over the process through amendments to the
Rome Statute.195
The Rome Statute’s strict approach to the principle of
legality shows that the states responsible for creating the ICC
did not want its judges to develop new international law. This
strongly suggests that states believe the value of having courts
develop new international law is low. Thus, while courts have
been moderately successful in developing new international law
in the past, the value of achieving this goal is low.
F. FOSTERING POST-CONFLICT RECONCILIATION
It is often argued that the work of international criminal
courts can foster post-conflict reconciliation.196 There are a
number of theories about how this might work. According to one
theory, ethnic, religious, and national divisions are at the heart
of many modern conflicts.197 These conflicts leave the opposing
sides deeply suspicious and hostile towards the other side.198 It
is common for each side to view themselves as victims of
unwarranted aggression by the other side.199 These feelings of
victimization and grievance make it harder to achieve a durable
peace and make it more likely that there will be more violence
in the future.200 By establishing a credible record of what
actually took place, courts can help break down inaccurate
narratives about the conflict.201 In turn, this can help the parties

195. See id. at 724 (“The rule of strict construction aims to protect the person
subject to investigation or prosecution by ensuring that the potential
infringement of their liberty is subject only to legislatively and not to judicially
defined crimes . . . .”); id. at 716 (noting that Article 22 embodies the premise
that “the law-maker is responsible for making the law clear and ascertainable,
while the judiciary is obliged to refrain in principle from penalizing conduct not
made criminal by the legislator”); Grover, supra note 179, at 554 (noting that
the Rome Statute adopts a strict approach to the principle of legality so as to
limit the ability of judges to create new law while simultaneously “ensur[ing]
respect for the law-making role of the legislature”).
196. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 311, Ford, supra note 63, at 463–75
(arguing that international criminal courts can foster post-conflict
reconciliation); Levitt, supra note 57, at 1970–71.
197. Ford, supra note 63, at 459.
198. Id. at 460–61.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 465–66.
201. Id. at 466–71.
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reconcile and reduce the risk of further violations.202 There are
other ways courts might be able to foster post-conflict
reconciliation. For example, courts may be able to decrease the
likelihood of future violations by providing an alternative to
revenge as a means for resolving grievances.203
Achieving post-conflict reconciliation is far from certain,
however. One problem is that inaccurate internal narratives
about the conflict are difficult to break down.204 Another problem
is that breaking down self-serving narratives may be a
prerequisite for reconciliation but it does not guarantee it.
Successful reconciliation still depends on the concerted efforts of
many other actors in society.205 Nevertheless, it may be possible
for courts to promote reconciliation, even if the process is slow.206
Ultimately, it seems only moderately likely that courts can
successfully foster post-conflict reconciliation in any particular
conflict.
Having discussed the likelihood that this goal can be
achieved, the next step is trying to put a value on achieving it. It
is important to note, however, that this “goal” is usually framed
as a mechanism to either restore peace or prevent future
violations.207 Rarely is it framed as an end in itself.
Nevertheless, helping post-conflict societies reconcile does have
intrinsic value. There is evidence that helping societies to
202. Id. at 471.
203. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 24–25 (“Channeling the desire for
vengeance into legal process, even with the imprisonment of thousands, bought
time until circumstances improved and mitigated the severity of retaliatory
abuses.”); Levitt, supra note 57, at 1970–71 (“Alternatively prosecutions may
serve as vehicles for public catharsis . . . and a society may need a sustained
and ritualized event to channel the grieving process.”); Turner, supra note 13,
at 537 (arguing that international trials can help to end violence by offering an
alternative to revenge as a means of providing retribution for past wrongs).
204. See Ford, supra note 63, at 466–68 (noting the difficulty of breaking
down self-serving narratives about conflict). See also Levitt, supra note 57, at
1971 (“[T]he tribunals’ adversarial processes may also deepen local divides.
Their client communities . . . may see tribunal activities through the polarized
lenses of their ethnic groups . . . .”).
205. See Ford, supra note 63, at 476 (suggesting other actors throughout
society can help alter internal narratives).
206. Id. at 468–71 (arguing that the IMT contributed to changes in German
attitudes towards WWII).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 202–203. See also Clark, supra note
60, at 420 (noting that reconciliation was viewed by the ICTY as a means to
maintain peace in the former Yugoslavia); id. at 421; deGuzman, supra note 47,
at 311 (“[R]estorative justice is about prevention of future crimes.”); id. at 311
(noting that post-conflict reconciliation is often a mechanism to enhance longterm peace and security).
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reconcile alleviates some of the trauma associated with the
violence of the past and improves the psychological health of
those who can forgive.208 Of course, the evidence also suggests
that how reconciliation occurs is also important and that some
mechanisms for achieving reconciliation may cause harm.209
Nevertheless, successful reconciliation within society is likely to
be associated with improved psychological health, which has
value.
Placing a value on this improvement is difficult, however.
One way to think about its value is to compare it with the value
of closure for victims. Fostering post-conflict reconciliation
seems conceptually similar to the goal of providing closure that
is discussed above.210 The major difference is that post-conflict
reconciliation covers the entire society, rather than just the
victims, and thus potentially has a broader reach. Nevertheless,
the goal of reconciling members of society appears to be quite
similar to the goal of providing closure to victims in that it seeks
to use a judicial process to help people come to terms with what
happened during the conflict.
The discussion above in Section V.C. argued that closure as
a goal has a relatively low value. When viewed as a goal in itself,
rather than as a mechanism to achieve prevention, it seems
likely that fostering post-conflict reconciliation has a similar
value. Thus, like closure, post-conflict reconciliation will be
assigned a low value. Accordingly, this goal is moderately likely
for courts to achieve and when it is achieved has a low value.

208. See Jacobus Cilliers et al., Reconciling After Civil Conflict Increases
Social Capital but Decreases Individual Well-Being, 352 SCIENCE 787, 787–88
(2016).
209. Id. at 787–88 (noting that while reconciliation achieved through longterm counseling appears to generally improve psychological health,
reconciliation that occurs as a result of targeted reconciliation efforts may
actually lower psychological health); id. at 791 (noting that individuals who
went through a targeted reconciliation process actually had worse psychological
health after the process).
210. For example, a number of scholars have treated victim participation in
the trials as an aspect of post-conflict reconciliation. See Pena, supra note 128,
at 501 (“[H]aving victims to participate in the trials allows them to experience
justice and can lay the foundation for reconciliation in the communities.”);
Trumbull, supra note 124, at 778 (“[P]articipation will . . . contribute to the
reconciliation process . . . .”).
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G. ENDING IMPUNITY
Another goal often attributed to international tribunals is to
end impunity.211 This goal appears explicitly in the Preamble to
the Rome Statute, which says that the ICC was created, in part,
to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” of the most
serious crimes.212 Thus, international courts are supposed to
strive to ensure that serious violations of international criminal
law are followed by “effective prosecution” such that violations
do not go unpunished.213 Ending impunity thus means ensuring
that everybody who commits an international crime is effectively
prosecuted. Unfortunately, success in achieving this goal is not
wholly within the court’s control. Even assuming that an
international court is successful in detaining and trying all of
the individuals it indicts,214 there will still be a very large
impunity gap because international tribunals have extremely
limited capacity,215 but serious violations of international
criminal law are almost always carried out by large hierarchical
groups working together.216 International courts cannot try all
of the perpetrators. In practice, courts have tended to focus on

211. See supra text accompanying note 58. See also Humphrey, supra note
113, at 498 (“ The principal goal of prosecutions in international criminal
tribunals has been to challenge impunity . . . .”); Van den Wyngaert, supra note
128, at 495 (“[B]asic purpose of the ICC . . . is to fight impunity.”).
212. Rome Statute, supra note 51, pmbl.
213. Id. (“Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their
effective prosecution must be ensured . . . .”).
214. This is probably an unrealistic assumption. See Yvonne M. Dutton,
Enforcing the Rome Statute: Evidence of (Non) Compliance from Kenya, 26 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2016); Stuart Ford, The ICC and the Security
Council: How Much Support is There for Ending Impunity?, 26 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 33, 62–63 (2016) [hereinafter Ford, The ICC and the Security
Council] (arguing that ICC is relatively weak compared to states and the lack
of state support has made it difficult for the court to succeed); Burke-White,
supra note 58; Ford, Complexity and Efficiency, supra note 26 at 38.
215. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 58, at 54.
216. See Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command
Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 159, 159-60 (2007) (noting that
international criminal violations are usually the result of the collective actions
of many individuals working towards the same ends); Cassese, supra note 190,
at 110 (“[I]nternational crimes . . . tend to be expression of collective
criminality, in that they are perpetrated by groups of individuals, military
details, paramilitary units or government officials acting in unison or in
pursuance of a policy.”); Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics at the ICTY:
Evidence from the Indictments, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 45, 65–68
(2013).

216

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

indicting and prosecuting senior leaders and those most
responsible.217 One consequence of these limits is that the vast
majority of low-level perpetrators are unlikely to be tried before
an international court.218 This creates a serious impunity gap.219
One way in which international courts help bridge this gap
is by supporting national prosecutions.220 For example, the ICTY
provided training and support to national prosecutions in the
former Yugoslavia.221 In addition, it transferred some cases to
national courts and provided national prosecutors with dossiers
compiled by the ICTY on individuals the ICTY did not have the
capacity to prosecute.222 The ICTR fostered cooperation with the
Rwandan justice system, helping with local investigations and
bringing Rwandan officials to Arusha to attend ICTR
proceedings.223 The ICC, on the other hand, does not have the
resources or the mandate to develop capacity amongst its
member states.224 As such, it will not directly train prosecutors

217. See Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1,
Jan. 16 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145 (“There is hereby established a Special Court
for Sierra Leone to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for
serious violations of international humanitarian law . . . committed in the
territory of Sierra Leone . . . .”); Akhavan, supra note 59, at 26 (“The ICRTR is
not intended to substitute for the Rwandese judicial system, but to serve as a
jurisdiction with limited resources focusing on the arrest and prosecution of the
most senior accused.”); Ford, supra note 216, at 71–73 (noting that the ICTY
initially indicted a number of low-ranking perpetrators but was pressured by
the Security Council to focus on those most responsible for the violence, which
in practice meant senior leaders).
218. See Rauxloh, supra note 60, at 743 (noting that because of limited
resources and a focus on those most responsible for serious crimes, a number of
lower-level perpetrators are not even investigated).
219. See Burke-White, supra note 58, at 74 (“An impunity gap arises where
an international forum prosecutes only those most responsible for international
crimes, leaving lesser offenders a degree of impunity.”).
220. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1974 (“[T]ribunal affiliates look to
prosecutions as a means to catalyze future prosecutions . . . may similarly spark
companion national prosecutions.”).
221. See Clark, supra note 60, at 423 (“The ICTY’s outreach department is
now primarily focused on capacity-building work, that is to say on developing
the capacity of local courts in the former Yugoslavia to prosecute war crimes.”).
222. See Ford, supra note 26, at 35–36 (noting that the ICTY transferred
seven cases to domestic courts in the former Yugoslavia as well as seventeen
dossiers containing evidence of crimes for which an ICTY indictment was never
confirmed).
223. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 26.
224. See Morten Bergsmo et al., Complementarity after Kampala: Capacity
Building and the ICC’s Legal Tools, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 791, 798, 802
(2010) (noting that there is broad agreement that the court should not directly
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or fund domestic investigations.225 It may assist in other ways,
however. For example, the ICC can provide information it
collects during its investigations to national systems and it can
help catalyze assistance from other actors, including other
states, international organizations and civil society groups.226 In
addition, the ICC has contributed to a project called the Legal
Tools Project to systematize and publicize documents relevant to
international criminal law. This project is intended to make
available the tools necessary for the practice of international
criminal law in domestic jurisdictions.227
The ICC may be able to promote domestic prosecutions in
other ways as well. First, the ICC may simply be able to
persuade states to undertake prosecutions.228 Second, the
structure of the Rome Statute provides incentives for domestic
prosecutions.229 Thus, the ICC may be able to help end impunity
without taking on the cases itself or directly supporting national
prosecutions.
Calculating an expected value for ending impunity requires
assessing both the likelihood that international tribunals can
end impunity and the benefit that would accrue if that goal could
be accomplished. The likelihood of ending impunity will be
assessed first. The most direct way that international courts
engage in domestic capacity building but that capacity building should be
undertaken by states, international organizations and civil society); BurkeWhite, supra note 61, at 84–85 (noting that the ICC does not have the capacity
to engage in resource-intensive attempts to build domestic judicial capacity).
225. Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Ponds: International Crimes
in National Courts, 90 IND. L. J. 829, 841–42 (2015).
226. Id. at n.90.
227. See Bergsmo et al., supra note 224, at 804–07.
228. Id. at 796 (noting that encouragement and persuasion can be effective
in promoting domestic prosecutions); Burke-White, supra note 58, at 55.
229. Article 17 of the Rome Statute deprives the ICC of jurisdiction over a
case if a state is making a genuine attempt to prosecute it. See Rome Statute,
supra note 51, art. 17. As a result, states can prevent the ICC from exercising
jurisdiction by undertaking their own investigations and prosecutions. This
incentivizes states to carry out domestic prosecutions as a way to preempt ICC
prosecutions. See Bergsmo et al., supra note 229, at 795 (“States may feel
‘forced’to investigate or prosecute cases involving core international crimes so
as to avoid any intrusion by the ICC into situations involving their nationals or
their territory.”); Burke-White, supra note 61, at 69–70 (noting that an ICC
investigation imposes significant reputational and sovereignty costs on states
and that states can avoid these costs by undertaking genuine investigations and
prosecutions). But see Burke-White, supra note 61, at 62–63 (arguing that in
some circumstances the ICC actually may decrease the likelihood of costly or
politically sensitive prosecutions in national systems by permitting states to
transfer responsibility for those cases to the ICC).
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contribute to this goal is through arresting and trying those
individuals they indict. But, international courts have not been
completely successful in obtaining custody over and trying even
the small number of individuals they indict. While the ICTY
managed to eventually obtain custody over most of its
indictees,230 it was not easy.231 The ICTR has been less
successful – there are still eight fugitives from the ICTR.232
For various reasons,233 the ICC has also had difficulty in
obtaining custody over the individuals it has indicted.234 For
example, senior Sudanese government officials have successfully
evaded the ICC’s arrest warrants.235 Similarly, Joseph Kony, the
leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army has successfully avoided
arrest.236 The Prosecutor has also been forced to drop charges
against senior Kenyan politicians due to their alleged
manipulation and intimidation of witnesses.237 As this
discussion shows, it is doubtful whether international courts can
completely end impunity even for senior leaders.
It is also very doubtful that international courts can
successfully promote the domestic prosecutions necessary to
close the impunity gap at the national level. First, many states
230. See Key Figures of the Cases, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases
(last visited Aug. 2, 2016) (showing that of the 161 individuals indicted by the
ICTY, the vast majority eventually appeared before the court and were tried).
A small number of indictees died before they could be tried and the indictments
were withdrawn against another twenty, but there are no more fugitives from
the ICTY. Id.
231. ICTY indictees, like Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, successfully
evaded the court for years. Ratko Mladic was initially indicted in 1995 but was
not arrested until 2011. See Case Information Sheet for Ratko Mladic, INT’L
CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf. Radovan Karadzic was indicted in 1995 but not
arrested until 2008. See Case Information Sheet for Radovan Karadzic, INT’L
CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
karadzic/cis/en/cis_karadzic_en.pdf.
232. See Key Figures of the Cases, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L
CRIM. TRIBUNALS, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last
visited Sept. 20, 2016).
233. See Ford, The ICC and the Security Council, supra note 214 (arguing
that ICC is relatively weak compared to states and the lack of state support has
made it difficult for the court to succeed).
234. See Burke-White, supra note 58.
235. See Ford, The ICC and the Security Council, supra note 214, at 38.
236. A warrant for his arrest was issued in 2005, but as of October 2016 he
was still a fugitive. See Case Information Sheet for Joseph Kony and Vincent
Otti, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony.
237. See Dutton, supra note 214, at 12–13 (2016).
FOR THE FORMER
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lack the necessary legislation to investigate and prosecute
violations of international law.238 Second, many states lack the
capacity to undertake domestic prosecutions.239 They often do
not have the necessary infrastructure, the necessary funding, or
a qualified judiciary.240 This problem is compounded by the large
number of cases that states would have to undertake to
investigate and prosecute all of the potential defendants.241
Third, state support for domestic prosecutions is not a given. In
situations where the perpetrator groups are part of the
government, the local authorities will often frustrate or oppose
prosecutions rather than support them.242 Even if national
prosecutions are undertaken, there is a risk that impunity will
continue if the prosecutions are designed primarily to prevent
ICC involvement rather than to ensure that justice is served.243
Thus, there are good reasons to doubt that international
criminal courts can promote the necessary domestic
prosecutions to close the impunity gap.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that domestic
prosecutions that have been spurred by international criminal
courts. 244 For example, the work of the ICTY and ICTR appears
to have triggered some domestic prosecutions of individuals
involved in international crimes committed in Rwanda and the
Balkans.245 The government of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) began a series of domestic prosecutions of war
crimes and crimes against humanity in response to the ICC’s
initiation of a preliminary examination.246 On the other hand,

238. See Bergsmo et al., supra note 229, at 801; Elizabeth B. Ludwin King,
Big Fish, Small Ponds: International Crimes in National Courts, 90 IND. L. J.
829, 838–39 (2015).
239. See Bergsmo et al., supra note 224, at 801–02; Burke-White, supra note
58, at 92.
240. See Bergsmo et al., supra note 224, at 801–02; King, supra note 238, at
837–38.
241. See Bergsmo et al., supra note 224, at 801–02.
242. See Dutton, supra note 214, at 24–29 (arguing that Kenya obstructed
the investigation of senior government officials); Ford, The ICC and the Security
Council, supra note 214, at 38.
243. See Burke-White, supra note 58, at 91.
244. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1974 (arguing that international
prosecutions appear to have catalyzed an increase in domestic prosecutions).
245. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 27 (noting that the work of the ICTY
and ICTR led several states to prosecute Yugoslav or Rwandan perpetrators
even when no international indictments had been issued); Burke-White, supra
note 58, at 63.
246. See Burke-White, supra note 58, at 106.
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there has also been criticism of the “marginal influence”
international criminal tribunals have had on domestic
prosecutions.247 Ultimately, it seems unlikely that international
courts can end impunity.248 They have not been able to end
impunity for the senior leaders that have been the focus of their
efforts.249 They are even less likely to be able to end impunity for
the vastly more numerous lower-level perpetrators.
The next step is to calculate the benefit that would result
from ending impunity. This goal is functionally similar to the
retribution goal but on a larger scale. After all, one of the main
purposes of ending impunity is to ensure that perpetrators are
identified and appropriately punished for their wrongful
conduct.250 This is essentially retribution writ large. Rather than
just trying a few leaders, if courts can end impunity, then all of
the perpetrators—and there could be hundreds or thousands of
them—will receive appropriate retribution. This suggests that
ending impunity, if it could be achieved, would have a higher
value than retribution. On the other hand, retribution has a low
value to states.251 This suggests that ending impunity, as an end
in itself, has only a moderate value. It may be morally
appropriate to punish wrongdoers, but states will not pay huge
sums to achieve a just punishment.
Rather, there is considerable evidence that states primarily
view ending impunity as a means to prevent violations.252 This
can be seen most clearly in the Preamble to the Rome Statute,
which says the ICC is intended “to put an end to impunity for
the perpetrators of [the most serious] crimes and thus contribute
to the prevention of such crimes.”253 Others theorize that ending
247. Id. at 96–97. See also Dutton, supra note 214, at 23–24 (noting that ICC
involvement in Kenya did not lead to domestic prosecutions of crimes associated
with the post-election violence in 2008); King, supra note 238, at 844–45 (noting
that the ICC’s interest in post-election violence in Kenya led the Kenyan
government to take some initial steps to implement domestic prosecutions but
that the prosecutions never occurred).
248. But see Levitt, supra note 57, at 1974 (arguing that, out of all their
goals, tribunals are most likely to achieve the goal of ending impunity).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 230–237.
250. See Humphrey, supra note 117, at 498 (“The principal goal of
prosecutions in international criminal tribunals has been to challenge impunity
by bringing . . . perpetrators under the scrutiny of the law.”).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 94–97.
252. See e.g., Burke-White, supra note 58, at 60 (noting various statements
by politicians claiming that ending impunity will either prevent violations of
international criminal law or prevent conflicts).
253. Rome Statute, supra note 51, pmbl.
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impunity is a mechanism to maintain or restore peace after a
conflict.254
Ultimately, it is unlikely that international tribunals truly
have the ability to end impunity through their work.255 More
importantly, the intrinsic value of ending impunity is
moderate.256 Its main value is as a mechanism to prevent
violations.257
H. PREVENTING VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW
It is often argued that international criminal courts can
prevent violations of international criminal law.258 For example,
the Rome Statute argues that the ICC will “contribute to the
prevention of” violations.259 There is less agreement, however,
about how prevention works. Some argue that prevention will
occur by deterring potential wrongdoers.260 According to this
theory, people will not commit violations if the expected adverse
consequences arising from the violation exceed the expected
benefit.261 By punishing violations, courts can increase the
expected costs of violations so that they exceed the expected
benefits and thereby deter future violations.262 Others argue
that by expressing condemnation for morally reprehensible acts,
courts may be able to change norms about the commission of
violations and thereby reduce violations.263 Another theory is
that by taking actions which foster post-conflict reconciliation,
courts can reduce the hostility and suspicion which can lead to

254. See Humphrey, supra note 113, at 496.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 248–249.
256. See supra text accompanying note 251–252.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 253.
258. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 280 (noting that prevention is often
presented as a primary goal of international courts). But see Hyeran Jo & Beth
A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT’L
ORG. 443, 445–46 (2016) (listing commentators who have argued that the ICC
cannot prevent violations).
259. Rome Statute, supra note 51, pmbl.
260. See Damaška, supra note 47, at 339 (“In the adolescence of ad hoc
tribunals, the cardinal importance of general deterrence was frequently
invoked.”); id. at 344.
261. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at 447–48. See also deGuzman,
supra note 47, at 306–07 (discussing the theory of deterrence).
262. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at 447–48.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 170–174.
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outbreaks of violence.264
In addition to a number of different theories about how
prevention might work, there is also considerable debate about
whether any of the existing theories are viable.265 Thus, while
deterrence has been advanced as a mechanism for preventing
violations,266 there is also doubt about whether deterrence can
work in the context of international criminal law.267 Some of the
other theories about prevention have also been criticized as
unworkable.268 There is even some concern that international
prosecutions might cause more violations by encouraging the
individuals responsible for the violence to cling to power.269 As a
result, the theory related to prevention is extremely muddled.
There is little agreement among international criminal law
scholars about how prevention works or whether any of the
commonly-articulated mechanisms are likely to prevent crimes.
Even in the absence of a sound theoretical basis, however,
there have been attempts to identify situations where
international courts have prevented crimes.270 The best example
264. See supra text accompanying notes 197–203, 207.
265. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 47, at 270 (noting that the question of
whether international courts can deter crimes is “highly contested”).
266. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 12 (arguing that the political elites who
cause mass violence are more likely to engage in some sort of “rational costbenefit calculation” than those who carry it out and are thus susceptible to
deterrence through indictment, prosecution and stigmatization); deGuzman,
supra note 57, at 308 (suggesting that, despite the debate about whether
deterrence works for international crimes, deterrence can provide a partial
justification for international courts).
267. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 10 (“Once mass violence has erupted,
threats of punishment can do little to achieve immediate deterrence.”);
Damaška, supra note 1, at 344–45 (arguing that deterrence is unlikely to work
for international crimes because the perpetrators are not rational actors and
because there is a very low likelihood of punishment); deGuzman, supra note
47, at 307–08 (noting that many commentators are skeptical of the ability of
international courts to deter criminal behavior for various reasons).
268. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 346 (noting that some commentators
have argued that persuasion will be futile in fostering compliance with
international law).
269. Courtney Hillebrecht, The Deterrent Effect of the International
Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya, 42 INT’L INTERACTIONS 616, 617 (2016)
(“Worst of all, however, what if the ICC has a perverse effect on the protection
of human rights? If perpetrators of human rights abuse expect that they will be
held accountable tomorrow, will they fight harder and dirtier today?”); id. at
627; Damaška, supra note 1, at 331–33 (noting that indictments of senior
leaders may actually exacerbate conflicts as those leaders “hold tenaciously to
the reins of power” so as to avoid being sent to an international court for trial).
270. See Burke-White, supra note 58, at 74 (“Some extant qualitative
research studies suggest for example, that certain ICC indictees were concerned
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of this approach is by Professor Akhavan.271 He concluded that
the ICC’s interventions in Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, and Darfur did
not make those situations worse and, in fact, appeared to
prevent some violence.272 On the other hand, commentators have
noted that the indictment by the ICTY of senior leaders in the
former Yugoslavia did not prevent those same individuals from
sparking a new conflict in Kosovo in 1999.273 Ultimately,
qualitative arguments are not likely to persuade those who are
convinced that international courts cannot prevent violence. To
convince the many doubters,274 a more systematic approach is
required.
Unlike most of the goals assessed in this Article, the
question of whether international courts can prevent atrocities
has been studied empirically.275 For example, Professor
Hillebrecht has studied the effect of the initiation of an ICC
investigation on the situation in Libya.276 Her study looked at
the effect of various actions taken by the ICC on the number of
about the prospect of ICC prosecution years before their indictment or arrest.”)
(“Paramilitaries have reportedly cited the Court’s potential prosecution as part
of their reasoning for relinquishing power.”); deGuzman, supra note 47, at 308
(noting one instance in which the threat of ICC action appears to have deterred
“hate speech that threatened to spark genocide”); Dutton, supra note 214, at
19–22 (arguing that the ICC’s indictments of senior Kenyan leaders following
post-election violence in 2008 led those same leaders to use much less combative
rhetoric during the next election and ultimately led to much more peaceful
elections in 2013). See also Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at 450 (noting several
instances of human rights violators expressing concern about the possibility of
an ICC indictment).
271. See Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a
Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political
Realism, 31 HUM RIGHTS Q. 624, 625 (2009) (using case studies of indictments
for leaders in Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Sudan, Professor Akhavan argues that
the ICC deters violence by raising the potential cost of it, rather than creating
perverse incentives for leaders who have been indicted to continue committing
human rights abuses to avoid arrest).
272. Id. at 636–52.
273. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (noting that hope for deterrence
faded as the ad hoc tribunals appeared unable to prevent violations); Levitt,
supra note 57, at 1965 (noting that both Serbian and Kosovar forces engaged in
violations of international criminal law in Kosovo in 1999 and that the ICTY
was not able to prevent those violations despite having indicted numerous
individuals for violations of international criminal law in the Balkans).
274. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at 446 (listing scholars who have
argued that the ICC cannot prevent violations).
275. See Hillebrecht, supra note 269; Jo & Simmons, supra note 258; James
Meernik, The International Criminal Court and the Deterrence of Human
Rights Atrocities, 17 CIVIL WARS 318 (2015).
276. See Hillebrecht, supra note 269.
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civilians killed per day in Libya by pro-government forces.277 She
found that civilian casualties decreased after the ICC took action
in Libya and concluded that “the ICC can, in fact, serve as a
deterrent of violence against civilians, particularly governmentsponsored civilian casualties, during ongoing conflict.”278 There
are some caveats279 and the preventive effect she found is
“modest.”280 Nevertheless, Professor Hillebrecht did find
evidence that ICC intervention in Libya reduced the number of
civilian casualties.281
Professor Meernik has taken a slightly different approach to
studying the effect of the ICC. He looked at the question of
whether joining the ICC lowered the likelihood that a country
would experience human rights violations.282 While the factor in
his model with the largest impact on violence was a country’s
commitment to the rule of law—countries with a strong
commitment to the rule of law were much less likely to
experience human rights violations—he found that a country’s
commitment to the ICC was also a significant factor.283
Countries that exhibited a strong commitment to the ICC had
less violence than countries with a similar commitment to the
rule of law but less commitment to the ICC.284 Professor Meernik
also found that states with a strong commitment to the ICC were
less likely to be the subject of ICC investigations.285 Ultimately,
he concluded that his findings “support” the conclusion “that the
ICC can exercise a deterrent impact.”286
Professors Jo and Simmons have also assessed the
preventive effect of the ICC. In their study, they focused on
277. Id. at 628–29.
278. Id. at 632.
279. For example, Professor Hillebrecht notes that the ICC in Libya acted
with the support of both NATO and the Security Council and that the result
might not be the same if the ICC were acting alone. Id. at 737–38.
280. Id. at 632.
281. Id. at 637.
282. See Meernik, supra note 275.
283. Id. at 331–33. See also id. at Tables 1, 2 & 3 (finding that ICC support
had a statistically significant effect on the extent of human rights abuses).
284. Id. at 333 (“States that demonstrate further commitment to the ICC by
enacting domestic legislation that provides for national prosecution of
international crimes; by ratifying the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities
for the ICC; and by refraining from concluding a bilateral immunity agreement
with the United States are more likely to have better human rights records and
be involved in less internal violence.”).
285. Id. at 334–35.
286. Id. at 333.
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whether various actions reduced the level of civilian casualties
during civil wars.287 They found that ICC ratification was
associated with a nearly fifty percent decrease in the rate at
which government forces killed civilians.288 They also found that
as the number of prosecutorial acts by the ICC increased (e.g.,
opening of preliminary examinations, opening of formal
investigations, and issuance of arrest warrants) the number of
civilian deaths attributable to the government decreased.289 The
incorporation of a state’s ICC obligations into domestic law was
also associated with a decrease in civilian deaths caused by
governments.290 These effects persisted even after controlling for
numerous other factors that might affect civilian deaths.291 In
contrast, Professors Jo and Simmons found less effect on rebel
groups.292 Ultimately, they conclude that there is “strong
evidence of a reduction in intentional civilian killing by
government actors” as a result of the ICC.293
The results of these empirical studies are surprisingly
consistent. Although they used different methods, and looked at
different data sets, they all found that ICC intervention was
associated with a decrease in violence. While these studies
cannot definitively prove that the ICC was the cause of the
decrease in violence, the results are still persuasive evidence of
such an effect.
The magnitude of the effect, however, is uncertain.
Professor Hillebrecht found that the ICC’s investigation in Libya
only “modest[ly]” reduced violence against civilians.294 On the
other hand, Professors Jo and Simmons found a nearly fifty
percent reduction in civilians killed by government forces as a
result of the ICC.295 More data will be necessary to pin down the
287. Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at Table 1.
288. Id. at 461.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 463.
291. Id. at 466 (“The evidence of the ICC’s ability to deter is based on
rigorous controls for many underlying conditions that could plausibly contribute
both to ratification and reduced civilian killing, such as changing regime type,
quality of the rule of law, government-rebel reciprocity regarding civilians, even
changing experiences and preference with respect to peace and justice.”).
292. Rebel groups did not appear to be affected by ICC ratification or the
incorporation of ICC obligations into domestic legal systems. The number of
civilian deaths caused by rebels did decrease as the number of ICC actions
increased, but the effect was smaller than for government forces. Id. at 469–70.
293. Id. at 469.
294. See Hillebrecht, supra note 269, at 632.
295. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 258, at 461.
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magnitude of the ICC’s effect. While it is unclear how much the
ICC reduces violence, it is clear that it does not completely
eliminate it. This suggests that while significant violence will be
prevented, many acts of violence will still occur. Thus for
purposes of this Article, the likelihood of the ICC preventing any
particular potential act of violence is rated as unlikely.
Having estimated the likelihood of preventing violations of
international criminal law, the next step is to try to estimate the
benefit that would accrue if violations could be prevented.
Serious violations of international criminal law have a number
of hallmarks. They usually occur during or are associated with
armed conflicts.296 They are typically carried out by
hierarchically-organized groups working together,297 and the
victims are usually civilians, often women and children.298 The
most common crimes consist of rapes and murders, the infliction
of torture and other inhumane acts, the wholesale destruction of
homes, businesses and public infrastructure, and the forcible
displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from their
homes.299 They are often carried out with exceptional cruelty.300
These crimes have enormous costs and consequences for both the
victims and societies in which they occur.
We know that being a victim of a crime can have serious
consequences for the individual.301 These effects can include
shock and loss of trust in society, guilt at having been the victim
of a crime, temporary or permanent incapacity stemming from
physical injuries, financial losses, psychological changes,
including fear, anger and depression, and social effects that
change an individual’s lifestyle.302 Many of these effects can also
be felt by the families, friends, and colleagues of the victim.303
While the vast majority of crime victims will feel some
emotional effect of the crime,304 victims of violence and sexual
assault are more likely to be affected by the crime than victims
of non-violent crimes and it is more likely that the effects will
296. See Ford, supra note 4, at Section II(C).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See Joanna Shapland and Matthew Hall, What Do We Know About the
Effect of Crime on Victims?, 14 INT’L R. OF VICTIMOLOGY 175, 178–79 (2007).
302. Id.
303. Id.at 179.
304. Id. at 181 (noting that more than eighty percent of crime victims report
being emotionally affected by the crime).
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persist over the long term.305 Thus, violent crimes tend to have
a larger impact than other kinds of crime. And, of course, the
widespread commission of violent crimes is the hallmark of
violations of international criminal law.
Most studies of the effect of crime on victims take place in
countries that are at peace. Nevertheless, the small amount of
research on the effect of crimes committed during conflicts
supports the conclusion that victims of conflict-related violent
crimes are highly likely to suffer severely.306 Indeed, even those
who are “only” subjected to forced displacement nonetheless
suffer significant harm.307
Above and beyond the direct effects on the victims and their
friends and families, crime can also have very serious economic
costs for society as a whole.308 The most common direct costs of
crime are for medical care, property loss, and costs associated
with the criminal justice system.309 Indirect costs can include
things like loss of productivity.310 Unsurprisingly, physical
violence, particularly murder, appears to generate the largest
societal costs compared to other forms of crime.311 In developed
countries, where most of the research is conducted, the economic
costs of crime run into the billions of dollars per year.312
While most of the research on the costs of crime has focused
on the kinds of crimes that are most common in domestic
systems, there have also been some studies of the economic
effects of mass atrocities on society. That research shows that
serious violations of international criminal law have enormous
costs. For example, the economic cost of the conflict in Darfur is
estimated to be tens of billions of dollars.313 A study of the cost
305. Id. at 196–97.
306. Id. at 199–200.
307. See, e.g., James M. Shultz et al., Internally Displaced “Victims of Armed
Conflict” in Colombia: The Trajectory and Trauma Signature of Forced
Migration, 16 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPORTS, at 4 (2014) (“IDPs [internally
displaced persons] experience extraordinary adversities, overt danger, and
psychological distress throughout all phases along the trajectory of
displacement, leading to chronic elevation of risks for victimization, physical
ailments, and mental disorders.”).
308. See also Nyantara Wickramasekera et al., Cost of Crime: A Systematic
Review, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 218 (2015).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See Hamid E. Ali, Estimate of the Economic Cost of Armed Conflict: A
Case Study from Darfur, 24 DEF. & PEACE ECON. 503 (2012).
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of the Rwandan genocide argued that Rwandan GDP would have
been twenty-five to thirty percent higher if the genocide had not
taken place.314 These findings are consistent with a body of
research that has found that widespread violence within a
society has very significant economic consequences.315
In short, the cost of the crimes associated with the kinds of
conflicts where international criminal courts become involved
are enormous and can easily be in the tens to hundreds of
billions of dollars.316 This suggests that preventing those crimes
would have an extremely high value because it would avoid
those costs. For this reason, this Article assigns the prevention
of serious violations of international criminal law an extremely
high value.
I. MAINTAINING OR RESTORING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY
International criminal courts are sometimes tasked with
maintaining or restoring international peace and security.317
This goal appears to be the one that is most divorced from the
actual work of courts because no modern international criminal
court has had jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, although
that is set to change in July 2018 when the ICC will be permitted
to exercise jurisdiction over aggression.318 This means that no
314. See Humberto Lopez & Quentin Wodon, The Economic Impact of Armed
Conflict in Rwanda, 14 J. AFR. ECON. 586 (2005). See also Pieter Serneels &
Marjike Verpoorten, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Economic Performance:
Evidence from Rwanda, 59 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 555 (2015) (finding that the
areas in Rwanda that had the worst violence also had the poorest subsequent
economic performance).
315. See Sanjeev Gupta et al., Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict and
Terrorism in Low and Middle-Income Countries (Fiscal Affairs Department,
IMF Working Paper No. 02/142, 2002); see also Alberto Abadie & Javier
Gardeazabal, The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque
Country, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 113 (2003); Anke Hoeffler & Marta Reynal-Querol,
Measuring the Costs of Conflict (March 2003); Stergios Skaperdas, The costs of
organized violence: a review of the evidence, 12 ECON. GOVERNANCE 1 (2011);
Nicholas Staines, Economic Performance Over the Conflict Cycle (IMF Working
Paper WP/04/95, 2004).
316. For example, one study concluded that the average cost of a civil war
was somewhere between $60 and $250 billion. See Paul Collier et al., The
Security Challenge in Post-Conflict Countries 19–20 (April 2008).
317. See supra Section III (explaining the goals of international criminal
courts).
318. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 15 bis (establishing jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression); Dapo Akande, The International Criminal Court
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court has been able to punish a party that wrongfully started an
armed conflict. As a result, there was little likelihood that
international courts could deter the initiation of conflicts, at
least in the sense that deterrence is usually used in domestic
criminal law.319 Nevertheless, there are some theories about how
international criminal tribunals can help restore and maintain
peace and security even in the absence of jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. One theory is that by indicting and
convicting the architects of the violence for other violations of
international criminal law, courts may be able to remove the
individuals most likely to spark a new armed conflict.320 Even if
a court cannot directly remove the architects of violence from
power, an indictment may isolate them and weaken their grip
on power.321 Another theory posits that by fostering post-conflict
reconciliation, courts can defuse the hostility and suspicion that
might lead to later conflicts.322 On the other hand, there has been
a concern that criminal indictments could exacerbate conflict by
causing the participants to resist peace.323 Luckily, there is little
evidence that intervention by courts makes conflicts worse.324

Gets Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, EJIL:TALK! (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-international-criminal-court-gets-jurisdictionover-the-crime-of-aggression/ (noting that the Assembly of State Parties passed
a resolution permitting the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression beginning in July 2018).
319. Deterrence theory requires that the act be subject to some sort of
penalty for its commission. If the act cannot be prosecuted, then courts cannot
deter it.
320. See Turner, supra note 13, at 538 (arguing that by removing the
architects of the violence from the scene through incarceration courts can lower
the chance of future violence); see also Akhavan, supra note 59, at 7 (“The
removal of leaders with criminal dispositions and a vested interest in conflict
makes a positive contribution to post-conflict peace building.”).
321. See Akhavan, supra note 59, at 7 (arguing that, even if indicted leaders
are not immediately apprehended and prosecuted, the stigma of an indictment
and exclusion from the international community can undermine those leaders’
grip on power and make further violations more costly and thus less attractive).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 196–203, 207 (arguing that
international criminal courts can foster post-conflict reconciliation).
323. See Damaška, supra note 1, at 331 (noting that indictments of senior
leaders may actually exacerbate conflicts as those leaders “hold tenaciously to
the reins of power” so as to avoid being sent to an international court for trial);
deGuzman, supra note 47, at 272 (noting that there was criticism of the ICC’s
indictment of President Bashir of Sudan on the grounds that it would make it
harder to achieve peace in Darfur).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 275–295 (examining the empirical
evidence of the ICC’s effects on conflict and finding that there is good evidence
that the ICC reduces violence rather than exacerbates it).
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There have been various attempts to demonstrate that
courts can (or cannot) prevent conflicts. For example, Professor
Akhavan argues that the ICTY helped to de-legitimize Slobodan
Milošević325 and that the ICTR helped prevent Hutu extremists
from returning to power.326 On the other side, several
commentators have noted that the ICTY’s intervention in the
Balkans did not prevent the conflict in Kosovo in 1999.327 More
recently, the ICC has had little luck ending the conflict in Darfur
despite indicting President Bashir.328 In the end, the evidence
that courts can prevent conflicts before they begin or end them
after they have begun is weak.329 Indeed, in general, we do not
know how to predict when conflicts will occur or how to prevent
them when they do occur.330 Ultimately, the theoretical
underpinnings of this goal are lacking,331 and there is little
evidence that international courts have been able to prevent
conflicts.332 Consequently, it is unlikely that international
criminal courts can prevent conflicts from occurring.333
325. Akhavan, supra note 59, at 9 (“[T]he work of the ICTY . . . has permitted
the ascendancy of more moderate political forces backing multiethnic
coexistence and nonviolent democratic process . . . helped to delegitimize
Milošević’s leadership . . . .”).
326. Akhavan, supra note 59, at 9 (arguing that the ICTR’s indictments
prevented the “rehabilitat[ion] of Hutu extremists”).
327. See Levitt, supra note 57, at 1965–66 (noting that the establishment of
the ICTY did not prevent Serbian and Kosovar forces from starting a conflict in
Kosova in 1999); Schrag, supra note 1, at 429 (noting that conflict in the former
Yugoslavia continued for a year and a half after the ICTY was established and
that the ICTY was criticized for being incompatible with peace).
328. See Ford, The ICC and the Security Council, supra note 214, at 37–38
(2016) (noting that the conflict in Darfur has continued on for over ten years
and that the Sudanese government considers it a notable achievement to have
frustrated the ICC’s attempts to arrest Sudanese government officials).
329. See generally Hillebrecht, supra note 269 (finding that the ICC was able
to reduce the violence in Libya but it was unable to prevent it or end it).
330. See Peter Rudolf, Evidence-Informed Prevention of Civil Wars and Mass
Atrocities, 51 INT’L SPECTATOR 86 (2016) (discussing the difficulty of preventing
political violence).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 318–319 (noting that this goal is the
most divorced from the actual work of the tribunals).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 327–330.
333. This conclusion may eventually have to be revisited. Now that the ICC
has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, it may be in a better position to
prevent conflicts from occurring by threatening prosecution. But, there are still
a number of jurisdictional limitations that may make aggression prosecutions
quite rare. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, arts. 15 bis, 15 ter. If the ICC rarely
brings cases, the deterrent effect may be small. See Hillebrecht, supra note 269,
at 624 (arguing that deterrence is largely a function of the “likelihood of
accountability”). It may take a decade or more (and several aggression
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Having addressed the likelihood that this goal can be
achieved, the next step is to assess what value achieving the goal
would have. This will be done by comparing its value to the value
of preventing violations. Restoring or maintaining international
peace and security is often listed as a separate goal from that of
preventing violations of international law, but in practice they
are aimed at achieving similar effects. The main purpose of
preventing violations of international criminal law is to stop the
violence against civilians that is associated with armed
conflicts.334 Restoring or maintaining peace would have a similar
effect by preventing the conflict that leads to the violence.335 In
short, both appear to be directed largely at preventing the
prosecutions) before we can draw any conclusions about whether having
jurisdiction over aggression makes it easier for the ICC to prevent or end
conflicts.
334. The focus on violence associated with armed conflicts is technically
inaccurate because genocide and crimes against humanity can occur outside an
armed conflict. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, arts. 6–7 (describing the legal
elements of genocide and crimes against humanity; neither requires the
existence of an armed conflict as a jurisdictional requirement). However, in
practice, genocide and crimes against humanity often occur alongside armed
conflicts. Two of the nine current ICC investigations involves a possibility of
genocide and both occurred in the context of an armed conflict. See Ford, supra
note 4, at Table 1. Of the eight situations the ICC is currently investigating that
involve crimes against humanity, six took place during an armed conflict. Id.
Thus, most violations of international criminal law are associated with conflicts
even if that is not a legal requirement of crimes against humanity or genocide.
As a result, it is fair to say that international criminal courts are primarily
interested in stopping the violence associated with armed conflicts, even though
they can (and occasionally do) have jurisdiction over violence that occurs outside
of an armed conflict.
335. Again, this is slightly inaccurate because crimes against humanity and
genocide are prohibited by international criminal law but can occur outside of
an armed conflict. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, arts. 6–7; Ford, supra note
4, at Table 1. Thus preventing armed conflicts would not necessarily prevent all
violations of international criminal law. Nevertheless, crimes against humanity
and genocide would likely constitute a threat to international peace and
security even when such crimes are not committed during an armed conflict.
For example, when the United Nations Security Council referred the situation
in Libya to the ICC, it found that there were “widespread and systematic
attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the
civilian population [that] may amount to crimes against humanity” but it did
not conclude that there was on ongoing armed conflict. See S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb.
26, 2011). However, the Security Council suggested that the attacks were a
threat to international peace and security and used its enforcement powers
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to refer the matter to the ICC
and impose an arms embargo. Id. Consequently, this article will assume that
achieving the peace and security goal would include preventing all violations of
international criminal law even if they do not take place during an armed
conflict.
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violence that accompanies armed conflicts.336 The question then
becomes, is the goal of preserving international peace and
security actually different from the goal of prevention? The
answer is that there are some differences, but they are relatively
small and those differences may disappear completely in the
future.
Modern international criminal courts have had jurisdiction
over three crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide.337 Much of the violence that occurs during armed
conflicts would be prevented by compliance with these laws, but
not all of it. Some types of violence are permitted during an
armed conflict. For example, combatants are permitted to target
and kill other combatants during conflicts.338 They are also
permitted to attack and destroy military objectives.339 In some
limited circumstances, they are even permitted to cause civilian
casualties and damage civilian objects.340 In effect, there is some
violence that occurs during armed conflicts that is neither a war
crime, a crime against humanity, nor genocide. Mainly, this
harm is directed towards participating combatants and military
objects. Such harm would be eliminated by maintaining or
restoring international peace and security but would not be
prevented simply by compliance with the law covering war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. This suggests
that the value of achieving the goal of maintaining peace is
higher than the value of achieving the goal of preventing
336. As noted above, this is slightly inaccurate because violations of
international criminal law can occur outside of an armed conflict. See supra note
334. Most violations, however, do occur in connection with an armed conflict.
Id. Moreover, most violations that occur outside of armed conflicts will
constitute threats to international peace and security. See supra note 335. As a
result, if the goal of maintaining international peace and security is achieved,
this will also mean that violations of international criminal law that do not
occur during a conflict are prevented. For this reason, the statement in the text
above may be slightly inaccurate, but it is not inaccurate in a way that matters
for the argument advanced here.
337. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 5(1).
338. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 46 (2d ed. 2016).
339. Id. at 506.
340. Civilians can never be deliberately targeted, but some civilian
casualties are permitted as a side effect of a legitimate attack on a military
objective, so long as the expected civilian casualties are proportional to the
military advantage to be gained from the attack on the military objective.
Similarly, while civilian objects are entitled to a presumption of immunity from
attack, if civilian objects are used for military purposes, then they may
legitimately be attacked. Id. at 293.
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violations of international criminal law because more harm
would be prevented.
Its value may not be much higher, however. The amount of
additional value that preventing conflicts would produce over
preventing violations of international criminal law depends
largely on the ratio of civilian to combatant deaths during
conflict. If combatants represent the majority of conflict-related
deaths then preventing conflicts would have considerably more
value than just preventing violations of international criminal
law. If, on the other hand, civilian deaths constituted the vast
majority of conflict-related deaths, then the added value of
preventing combatant deaths might not be very large. It is hard,
however, to be certain of the ratio of combatant to civilian
deaths. While many sources suggest that ninety percent of the
dead in modern conflicts are civilians, it is doubtful the ratio of
combatant to civilian deaths is that high.341 Nevertheless, it does
appear that civilian deaths are significantly more numerous
than combatant deaths in most modern conflicts.342 Thus, the
additional value provided by preventing combatant deaths may
be relatively small compared to the value provided by preventing
civilian deaths because there are significantly fewer combatant
deaths.
This conclusion is complicated somewhat by plans for the
ICC to assume jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in July
2018.343 When this occurs, the ICC will have the authority to
prosecute individuals for causing armed conflicts.344 At that
point, the goal of preventing violations of international criminal
law will include the goal of preventing conflicts. The addition of
aggression to the ICC’s jurisdiction will have the effect of
341. See Adam Roberts, Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims
Civilians?, 52 SURVIVAL 115 (2010) (arguing that the ninety percent statistic is
not supported by reliable data).
342. See id. at 126 (acknowledging that a number of recent conflicts in Africa
appear to have had high civilian to combatant death ratios and that these
conflicts may be “typical of the post-Cold War world”). See also Valerie Epps,
Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral Damage
Rule, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 329 (2013) (“Nonetheless, it seems more
than fair to conclude that since the turn of the twentieth century, civilian deaths
have outnumbered military deaths in nearly all wars.”).
343. See supra note 318.
344. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 8 bis (“‘[A]ct of aggression’ means
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of another State . . . . Any of the following acts . . .
shall . . . qualify as an act of aggression: The invasion or attack by the armed
forces of a State of the territory of another State . . . .”).

234

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

rendering the goal of preventing violations of international
criminal law virtually co-extensive with the goal of maintaining
international peace and security.
Leaving aside for now the effect of granting the ICC
jurisdiction over aggression,345 it appears the value of achieving
the goal of maintaining and restoring peace and security has a
modestly higher value than the goal of preventing violations of
international criminal law. Given that prevention was given an
extremely high value, achieving the goal of maintaining or
restoring international peace and security will also be assigned
an extremely high value. This means that this goal is extremely
unlikely to occur but also extremely valuable when it does occur.
VI.

A HIERARCHY OF THE GOALS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS

It is now possible to fill in the expected value matrix. The
completed matrix is presented as Table 2 below. It contains the
likelihood that each goal will be achieved and the value that
would occur if the goal was achieved. At some level, the results
are not surprising. The goals that are easiest to achieve have low
values, while some of the harder to achieve goals have higher
values. In essence, there is no low-hanging fruit. The goals that
are worth the most are not easy to achieve.
There is only one goal that international criminal courts are
likely to achieve in most trials—retribution.346 This is to be
expected because assigning responsibility for violations of the
law and punishing the guilty is fundamentally what courts are
designed to do. Thus, it is not surprising that they are better at
accomplishing this than their other goals, which are all less
closely connected to the day-to-day work of courts.
Unfortunately, the evidence indicates that states do not attach
a particularly high value to this goal, and it seems unlikely that
international criminal courts would continue to be created and
funded if this was the only thing they accomplished. Therefore,
retribution cannot be the principal goal of such courts, even
though it is the most immediate result of the work of those
courts.

345. See supra note 333 (noting that it may take a decade or more before any
firm conclusions about the effect of granting the ICC jurisdiction over
aggression can be drawn).
346. See supra Section V.A.
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Table 2: Expected Value of Goals

Value if benefit occurs

Extremely
High

Maintaining
or restoring
peace

Preventing
violations

High
Ending
impunity

Moderate

Establishing a
historical record
Expressing
condemnation
Closure for
victims

Low

Extremely
Unlikely

Unlikely

Developing
international
law

Retribution

Fostering
reconciliation
Moderately
Likely

Likely

Likelihood of benefit occurring

Next come four goals that courts are only moderately likely
to achieve in any particular situation: 1) establishing an
accurate historical record; 2) expressing condemnation of
morally abhorrent conduct; 3) developing international criminal
law; and 4) fostering post-conflict reconciliation. Each of them
has been assigned a low value (even assuming they can be
achieved). At first glance, this may seem surprising. Three of
these goals, establishing the record, expressing condemnation,
and fostering reconciliation, have been advocated as important
goals of international criminal courts by at least some
commentators.347
While it is true that these have been described as important
347. See supra text accompany notes 121, 163–164, 207–208. Developing
international criminal law, on the other hand, has rarely been described as a
principal goal of international courts. See sources cited supra note 189.
Moreover, it is fairly clear that states are opposed to courts taking on this duty
and would prefer to do the development themselves so that they can control its
direction. See sources cited supra note 191. Assigning it a low value is probably
not controversial.
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goals of courts, it is more accurate to describe them as
mechanisms by which other (more valuable) goals may be
achieved. There is undoubtedly some intrinsic value in
establishing what occurred, in expressing condemnation, and
helping societies reconcile after conflict, but the value of these as
ends in themselves is not high. Rather, these “goals” are usually
advanced as a means to accomplish something else. Expressing
condemnation is usually advocated as a means to establish
global norms of conduct in the hope that this will prevent
violations of international criminal law.348 Similarly,
establishing an accurate historical record is argued to be a
means to foster post-conflict reconciliation,349 which itself is
often offered as a means to prevent future violations.350 In short,
these three “goals” are best thought of as mechanisms by which
future violations of international criminal law may be prevented.
As a result, they have low intrinsic value.
Next is ending impunity.351 It seems unlikely that
international criminal courts can end impunity. They cannot
even end impunity for the senior leaders that they are designed
to investigate and prosecute, and they are poorly positioned to
end impunity for the vastly larger number of lower-ranking
perpetrators who actually carry out the atrocities. Moreover,
even if it could be achieved, this goal has only a moderate value.
It is essentially retribution on a grander scale, but states have
shown little interest in retribution as an end in itself. Rather,
ending impunity is usually advocated as a means to prevent
future violations.

Providing closure to victims has an even lower expected
value than ending impunity.352 First, international criminal
courts are not able to provide closure for the vast majority of
victims. International tribunals charge only a small subset of the
crimes that have been committed in any given situation. Thus,
most victims will be excluded from the court’s work because the
crimes that victimized them will not be prosecuted. Moreover,
states’ contributions to the Trust Fund for Victims suggest they
place a low value on providing closure and redress for victims.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

See supra Section V.D.
See supra Section V.B.
See supra Section V.F.
See supra Section V.G.
See supra Section V.C.
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This leaves two goals to discuss: preventing violations and
maintaining or restoring peace and security. While these goals
are conceptually distinct, in practice, they are aimed at
accomplishing something quite similar: both are aimed at
minimizing the violence associated with conflict.353 Maintaining
or restoring peace and security has a slightly higher value than
prevention when it occurs because it would prevent more harm,
but it is also less likely to occur. As a result it has a lower
expected value than prevention. Both goals, if they could be
achieved, would prevent enormous harm from occurring.
Qualitative and theoretical assessments of whether courts
can prevent violations have resulted in intense disagreements
about whether this goal can be achieved.354 Of all the goals
discussed in this Article, however, only this one has been studied
empirically. Perhaps surprisingly in light of the dispute in the
theoretical literature, all of the empirical studies have found
that the ICC reduced violations, sometimes by significant
amounts. Given the enormous value of preventing violations,
finding that the ICC does reduce violations means that this goal
has a very high expected value.
Table 2 provides important information about the hierarchy
of the goals of international criminal courts. Retribution should
be higher in the hierarchy than establishing an accurate
historical record, expressing condemnation of morally abhorrent
conduct, developing international criminal law, or fostering
post-conflict reconciliation because it has a similar value when
achieved but is more likely to be achieved. Similarly, providing
closure for victims should come behind all of these goals because
it is even less likely to occur but has a similar value when it does
occur. Preventing violations has a higher expected value than
maintaining or restoring peace because they both have
extremely high values when they occur but prevention is more
likely to occur. Ending impunity has a higher expected value
than providing closure to victims because it occurs at about the
same rate but has a greater benefit when it does occur. By the
same logic, it has less value than prevention because it has a
much lower benefit when it does occur, even though it occurs at
about the same rate.
This certainly helps explain the relationships between the
goals, but it is not enough on its own to create a complete

353. See supra Section V.I.
354. See supra Section V.H.
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hierarchy. The main problem is that Table 2 does not dictate how
to rank the expected value of retribution against prevention.
Once the relationship between these two goals is established, the
rest of the list falls into place.
There are several different arguments that lead to the
conclusion that prevention should be highest in the hierarchy.
First, retribution cannot be the principal purpose of
international criminal courts because states assign it a low
value, yet they continue to join and fund such courts.355 This
suggests that they believe courts achieve some other goal, but
retribution has a higher expected value than most of the other
candidates, including developing international criminal law,
expressing
condemnation,
record-setting,
post-conflict
reconciliation, and providing closure. This only leaves three
other possibilities: prevention, maintaining peace and security,
and ending impunity. Prevention has the highest expected value
of these three goals, which strongly suggests this is the real
reason states join and support international tribunals. And
indeed, the Rome Statute expressly identifies prevention as a
key goal of the ICC.356
Second, it is striking that many of the “goals” of
international criminal courts that have been advanced by
scholars and commentators are better thought of as mechanisms
to prevent violations. Expressing condemnation, establishing a
historical record, fostering post-conflict reconciliation, and
ending impunity have all been advanced as ways to prevent
violations.357 This implies that prevention is the most important
goal of international criminal courts.
Third, while prevention is less likely to occur than
retribution, it is not that much less likely. The empirical studies
of prevention all suggest that the ICC has somewhere between a
modest and a significant impact on the violence associated with
mass atrocities. We do not know the exact likelihood that it will
reduce violence because there have been a limited number of
empirical studies of prevention and they do not agree on the size
of the reduction, but a conservative assumption is that it is
something like an order of magnitude less likely to occur than
retribution.358 Since expected value is the product of the
355.
356.
357.
358.

See supra Sections II and V.A.
See supra text accompanying note 259.
See supra Section V.H.
In fact, it may be considerably more likely to occur than this. At least
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likelihood of occurrence and the benefit that would occur if the
goal were achieved, then prevention will have more expected
value than retribution if its benefit is greater than an order of
magnitude larger than the benefit from retribution.359 There is
good reason to believe that the benefit that would be realized
from prevention is several orders of magnitude greater than the
benefit that would be realized from retribution.
Preventing the widespread violence associated with serious
violations of international criminal law has a value that runs
into the tens to hundreds of billion dollars of value per conflict.360
And this is only the part of the value that can be easily
measured—the direct economic costs of violence. There are also
substantial intangible costs like the pain and suffering of the
victims, which are hard to measure but are also avoided if
violence is prevented. In contrast, the expected value of
retribution is probably less than the annual budget of the ICC,
which is about $130 million per year.361 In other words, the
benefits of prevention outweigh the benefits of retribution by
several orders of magnitude. Thus, even though retribution is
more likely to occur, it has a significantly lower expected value
than prevention.
Finally, prevention’s preeminence over retribution can be
seen by imagining two different worlds. In the first world,
serious violations of international criminal law occur, and
international courts and domestic courts combine to fairly
adjudicate those violations. The trials have the effect of
providing appropriate retribution for all those responsible (thus
leaving no impunity gap). They also establish an accurate
historical record, provide an opportunity for closure to the
victims, express condemnation of those same crimes, and foster
post-conflict reconciliation. Finally, the court’s decisions

one study found a reduction in violence of nearly fifty perent under some
circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 287–288.
359. This assumes, as argued above, that prevention is at most an order of
magnitude less likely to occur than retribution.
360. See supra Section V.H.
361. In 2016, the ICC had a budget of 139 million Euros. See Assembly of
State Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 2017 of the International
Criminal Court, Doc. ICC-ASP/15/10, at Table 1 (Aug. 17, 2016). The exchange
rate on Dec. 30, 2016, was 1.05 dollars per Euro. See Foreign Exchange Rates –
H.10, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federal
reserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat00_eu.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). The
ICC’s budget was thus $132 million in 2016. Id.
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contribute to the further development of international criminal
law. This is a world in which essentially almost all of the hopedfor results of international tribunals except for prevention occur.
In other words, except for preventing violations, this is close to
the best-case scenario for such courts. This first world is an
unlikely outcome,362 but that is not the point.
Now imagine a second world which is identical to the first
world except that the violations of international criminal law
that were adjudicated in the first world did not take place
because the work of an international court prevented them from
occurring. None of the other consequences present in the first
world would occur. There would be no trials, no assigning of
responsibility, no establishment of the historical record, and no
post-conflict reconciliation. There would be no closure for
victims, no condemnation of the crimes, and no development of
international law. There would, however, be prevention of the
violations in the first place. This would undoubtedly be the
better of the two worlds.
Serious violations of international criminal law cause
massive harm. The victims suffer severe physical, psychological
and economic harm, so do their friends, neighbors and coworkers. There are also enormous economic costs for society as
a whole. Moreover, international courts can do little to mitigate
the effects of violations. Their principal job is to determine
whether the accused is guilty.363 They have little authority to
remedy the consequences of the accused’s actions.364 In this
regard, the ICC is something of an outlier because it has a
mandate to try to provide reparations to victims.365 It is,
however, essentially an unfunded mandate.366 In theory, the ICC
362. See Table 2 (noting that many of these goals are only moderately likely
or unlikely to occur). See also supra text accompanying notes 67–71 (noting the
tension between the various goals and the expected difficulty of achieving all of
them).
363. See supra Section II.
364. See Adrian Giovanni, The Prospect of ICC Reparations in the Case
Concerning Northern Uganda: On a Collision Course with Incoherence?, 2 J.
INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 25, 26 (2005) (noting that the ICC was the first
international court to be given the power to provide reparations to victims).
365. Id. See also Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 75 (laying out the court’s
authority to order perpetrators to provide “restitution, compensation, and
rehabilitation” to victims); id. art. 79 (establishing a trust fund for the benefit
of victims).
366. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312 (“[T]he ICC does not have the
resources or proximity to local populations to make significant direct
contributions to restoring victims or communities that have suffered mass
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can order convicted perpetrators to pay for reparations to their
victims, but most defendants claim indigence.367 Thus, whatever
the theoretical benefits of reparations, they cannot hope to
mitigate the economic costs of serious violations of international
criminal law.368 The available evidence suggests that trials are
not particularly good at remedying the non-economic
consequences of crime either.369
The resulting situation is one in which the costs of
international criminal law violations are enormous both for
society and for individuals within society, but the outputs that
courts produce (trials) have little likelihood of ameliorating
those harms after they have occurred. This suggests that
prevention has a vastly higher actual value when it occurs than
all of the other goals attributed to international tribunals put
together. Or, to go back to our thought experiment, the world in
which the crimes are never committed is a better world than the
one in which they were committed but a court successfully
adjudicated them, assigned responsibility, provided closure for
victims, established the historical record, and fostered postconflict reconciliation. As the old saying goes: an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure.370

violence.”); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 490–91 (“[T]he resources
available for reparations will probably not allow the Court to meet the
expectations of all victims. . . . Reparations for victims risk being more symbolic
than real.”).
367. See Linda M. Keller, Seeking Justice at the International Criminal
Court: Victims’ Reparations, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 189, 195–197 (2007); Van
den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 490 (“[M[ost accused have arrived in the
Court’s Detention Centre penniless.”).
368. See deGuzman, supra note 47, at 312 (“[T]he very limited amount of
reparations the Court [ICC] can provide to a small number of victims hardly
offers a convincing justification for its work.”); Van den Wyngaert, supra note
128, at 490 (“[T]he Fund [Trust Fund] has very limited resources, by far
insufficient to provide anything more than nominal sums to individual
victims.”).
369. See Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal
Proceedings, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 313, 319 (2002) (finding that two-thirds of the
crime victims in their study felt that the trial of the perpetrator had a negative
impact on them). See also Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of
Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. TRAUMATIC
STRESS 182 (2010) (reviewing research on whether criminal justice involvement
is beneficial or detrimental for crime victims and finding the results to be
mixed).
370. Cf. Daniel Kiel, An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure:
Reframing the Debate About Law School Affirmative Action, 88 DENV. L. REV.
791, 791 n.3 (2011) (attributing the saying “an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure” to Benjamin Franklin).
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For these reasons, prevention has a significantly higher
expected value than retribution. In fact, prevention has the
highest expected value of any of the goals and goes first in the
hierarchy. Maintaining and restoring international peace and
security comes next, as it has only a slightly lower expected
value than prevention.371 Next is retribution. After retribution
comes record-setting, post-conflict reconciliation, expressing
condemnation, and developing international law. These four
goals have approximately equal expected value and are thus tied
for fourth place in the hierarchy.372 Although there is some
uncertainty about its proper placement,373 ending impunity has
also been placed amongst the goals tied for fourth place. Finally,
providing closure for victims comes fifth.374 The hierarchy is
presented below in Table 3.
Table 3: Hierarchy of the Goals of International Criminal Courts
1.
Preventing violations of international criminal law
2.
Maintaining or restoring peace and security
3.
Retribution
4.
Establishing an accurate historical record
Expressing condemnation of morally abhorrent conduct
Fostering post-conflict reconciliation
Developing international criminal law
Ending impunity
5.
Providing closure for victims

VII.

CONCLUSIONS

There are many goals that international criminal courts
have been urged to achieve, but they do not have the resources
to pursue them all simultaneously. Consequently, having a
recognized hierarchy amongst them would help courts focus
their limited resources where it matters most. But despite
recognition that the lack of a hierarchy has hindered courts,
until now, there have been no attempts to establish a formal
371. See supra Section V.I.
372. See Table 2.
373. Theoretically, ending impunity could also come before or after the goals
that are tied for fourth place. Each of those placements would be consistent with
its location in the expected value matrix. See Table 2.
374. See Table 2.
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hierarchy amongst the goals of international criminal courts.
This Article is the first attempt to create a hierarchy of the
goals of international criminal law. It is unlikely that it will be
last word on this issue. Some scholars may disagree with the
ordering of specific goals. Others may propose different
methodologies for assessing the relative merits of the different
goals. But it is clear that much can be learned from the process
of trying to create such a hierarchy rather than simply
considering each goal in isolation. If others will take up the
question of how to assess the goals of international criminal
courts, it may be possible to reach a consensus on the
appropriate hierarchy. This would have enormous benefits for
international courts as they could use this information to focus
their limited resources where they will do the most good.
This Article has also identified an important distinction
between goals and mechanisms that should be central to any
later discussion of the goals of international criminal courts.
Many of the goals that have been advocated by scholars turn out,
upon closer inspection, to be mechanisms for the achievement of
some other goal. This is understandable when one focuses on one
goal at a time, but when all the goals are considered
simultaneously, the distinction between a goal and a mechanism
becomes very important. Once the goals that are primarily
mechanisms for the achievement of some other more important
goal (record-setting, post-conflict reconciliation, expressing
condemnation, and ending impunity) are stripped away, we end
up with five goals that appear to function largely as goals:
retribution, developing international law, closure for victims,
maintaining peace and security, and prevention.
Prevention is at the top of the hierarchy because it has both
an extremely high value when it does occur and we now have
good evidence that courts can prevent violations. This means
that courts should make prevention their primary focus.
Unfortunately, this does not tell us what courts should actually
do; we do not yet know how courts prevent violations, although
there are many theories.375 The question of what mechanisms
are best to prevent violations is an extremely important one and
further work is necessary. Having provided evidence that
international criminal courts can prevent violations, the next
step for empiricists is to look at ways to test the various

375. See supra Section V.H (describing various theories about how
international courts can prevent violations of international criminal law).
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prevention mechanisms that have been advanced. If the
mechanisms that best prevent violations can be identified, then
courts will know how to achieve their primary goal. Still,
knowing which goals are most important is a significant
achievement. Before courts can decide how best to achieve their
goals, they need to know which goals they should aim to achieve.
Some goals do not seem like good choices for courts to
pursue. In particular, seeking closure for victims, despite its
popularity with many civil society groups, seems to offer little in
the way of expected value. Courts are unlikely to achieve closure
for most victims and even when it is achieved, it probably has
modest value for most victims. Yet, courts and civil society
groups devote considerable resources to this goal. The results of
this Article suggest that those resources would be better utilized
elsewhere.
Instead, courts should focus on prevention as their primary
goal.376 We now know that courts can prevent at least some of
the violence associated with international crimes and that
prevention has enormous benefits for both individuals and
societies. Accordingly, courts should devote their resources to
preventing violations of international criminal law.

376. Maintaining or restoring peace comes in a close second. Currently,
maintaining or restoring peace is conceptually distinct from preventing
violations of international criminal law, but when the ICC begins to exercise its
new jurisdiction over aggression the differences with prevention will mostly
disappear. At that point, they will essentially be the same goal.

